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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is threefold:
• To evaluate how the portfolio performance of institutional investors differs
from the market index portfolio, first, as a whole, and second, as several
different institutional ownership portfolios.
• To investigate the relationship between the institutions' superior stock
selection ability and firm quality attributes such as beta, volatility, firm size,
and R&D expenditures. Most previous academic work has focused on
institutional investment behaviors, finding the relationship between
institutional ownership and firm quality attributes, based on only mutual
funds.
• To develop a decision model for future institutional investors' portfolio
performance based on the explanatory variables used in this study. The
dependent variable is portfolio gross return, and firm quality attributes are
independent.
The study group is selected from firms listed on the Compact Disclosure
database during the period Jan. 1989 - Dec. 1996. Approximately 8,000 NYSE,
AMEX, and NASDAQ companies are employed in this study. As analytical tools,

iii
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Sharpe’s measure (1966), Jensen's alpha measure (1968), and Jobson and Koririe’s Zstatistic (1981) are used.
From the results of the study, one may conclude that institutional investors as
a whole are not superior stock selectors; however, specific institutional ownership
portfolios performed in a superior manner. The institutions’ superior selection ability
is partly related to such firm quality attributes as small firm and stock volatility effects.
Previous studies find that institutional ownership is related to firm size; however,
institution’s portfolio performances are found to be inversely related to size. Higher
beta is not found to contribute to institutions' superior portfolio performance. This
study found that institutional investors act in a hyperopic manner when tested with
R&D expenditures. However, amounts of a firm’s R&D expenditures are inversely
related to institutions’ superior performance. Unexpectedly, stock volatility is found
to contribute to institutions’ portfolio excess returns, based on Jensen’s measure.
Finally, all firm quality attributes employed in this study as explanatory
variables appear to be significantly related to portfolio returns. All variables are
positively related to portfolio gross returns except R&D, which is inversely related.

iv
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Institutional investors1provide the largest and most popular types of publicly
available portfolio management services. They charge fees for their services, and they
manage trillions of dollars of marketable securities.
As large shareholders, institutional investors gain economies of scale in
information gathering and analysis of investments, and they possess better knowledge
about the market than individual investors (Black, 1992). They employ stock analysts
who draw on sophisticated computer-aided information networks when evaluating the
appropriateness of company expenditures. Individuals typically do not have access to
these resources. Institutional investors can process information more thoroughly before
making investment decisions, and as a result, they can make more rational investment
decisions than can individuals (Kochhar and David, 1996).
Corporate stock holdings by institutional investors have increased substantially
since Berle and Means (1932) conducted the first published study on stock ownership.
Institutions held $2.68 trillion in stocks at the end of 1992, a 48% jump from the $1.8

'Pension funds, insurance companies, banks, investment counselors, mutual funds, and financial
institutions.

1
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trillion held in 1990. Institutions held 46.8% of the outstanding publicly traded equity
in the United States as of beginning of 1993 (WSJ, Dec. 8, 1993).2 Those investors
engaged in approximately 75% of the dollar volume of trading on the New York Stock
Exchange (Brown and Brooke, 1993). Recent New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
surveys showed that institutional investors accounted for about 70% of its daily trading
volume (Szewczyk et al., 1992).
Growth created a great amount of interest in institutional investors, and their
performance stimulated considerable research related to performance and investment
choices, as well as continual monitoring and evaluation by investors. The monitoring
created incentives to make sound investment decisions that outside parties would deem
reasonable, well-informed, and prudent (Badrinath et al., 1989), thus implying that
institutional investors should provide fiduciary duties in handling client capital.
Institutional investors began to apply a "safety-net" rule (named by Badrinath
et al. in 1989) as a guide in determining investment choices. Managers who breached
their fiduciary duty were subjected to severe penalties under both common law and the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Such restrictions on
institutional investors affected the behavior of institutional investment. For example,

2As of September 30,1996, institutional investors held 44.25% ofthe outstanding publicly traded
equity listed on the NYSE and AMEX. Institutions held $3,880 trilion of overall market value of stocks
based on these two stock markets (Compact Disclosure, 30 September 1996). This study utilized data
from 1906 of the 1979 firms listed on the NYSE. Similarly, it used data for 483 of the 566 firms listed
on AMEX. It excluded the statistics for the other 73 NYSE-listed firms and the other 83 AMEX-listed
firms because of missing market value or institutional holdings information. Institutional investors held
more NYSE stocks than AMEX stocks. (44.46% of NYSE stocks and 28.7% of AMEX stocks).

J
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institutional investors concentrated their activity on the stocks of large firms because
of the more volatile behavior of small firms (Badrinath et al., 1989).
Much research during the last 30 years questioned whether any investment
strategy could consistently produce results superior to those obtained from simply
holding the market portfolio. Did they determine that institutional investors possessed
a real power to earn an above-normal rate of return in the securities market? Did those
institutional investors earn more than individual investors with less inference
capabilities than institutions? Or did they earn more than the passive strategy of
holding a market index portfolio? Research has produced neither a universally accepted
answer nor a theory to underlie the answer.
Recently, researchers have questioned whether other institutional investors could
produce results equal to those of mutual funds. One such research team, Bogle and
Twardowski (1980), concluded that among institutional investors, mutual funds
provided the highest equity rates of return. The collective literature, however, has not
stated whether collective institutional investors functioned as superior portfolio
performers compared to benchmark index funds.
Statement of the Problem
Despite the rapid growth of institutions’ corporate stock holdings, performance
evaluations of institutional investors do not completely account for investment behavior.
Previous research has revealed relationships between firm attributes and ownership of
common stocks; however, no published work that studied the relationship between each

Reproduced with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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attribute and institutional portfolio performance was found. Additionally, past research
has not identified what effects, if any, institutions had on capital markets or on
corporate strategies.
The negative relationship of a firm's volatility and institutional ownership might
be positively related to institutional portfolio returns (i.e., a security with high risk
should have provided a high return to risk averse investors.) Safety-net theory has
suggested that institutional investors prefer large firms to small firms. However, there
is evidence that small firms generated greater risk-adjusted rates of return.
An investigation of whether the performance of institutional investors, taken as
a whole, exceeded the performance of the overall market should have concerned
professional investors and financial-markets researchers. For example, as the safety-net
theory implied, an inferior performance by institutional investors might have resulted
from selecting securities emphasizing safety rather than return. This result might come
from considerable prudence by institutional investors in their portfolio management.
Most previous studies in this area have concentrated on mutual funds’
performance. However, mutual funds could not represent the panoply of institutional
investors because each investor might have different interests as well as different
transaction costs. If institutional investors performed as superior investors, where did
the extra returns come from? Did they originate in beta (P), stock volatility (o), or
firm size effects? Finally, did this superior selection ability of institutional investors,
taken as a group, contribute to the rapid growth of institutional holdings of corporate
stocks?

J
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Capital-market researchers need to investigate whether institutional investors
have superior portfolio selection ability.

Employers must meet prudent investing

standards under the Employees Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), and evaluate
how the need to fond retirement benefits can affect their long-term earnings. If they
or their portfolio managers select superior portfolios, the firms’ returns ability will
improve.

Employers typically rely on institutional investors such as insurance

companies, investment advisors, or specialized mutual funds acting on behalf of pension
funds to perform portfolio selection.
Scope and Purpose of the Study
This study analyzes the cross-sectional predictability of equity returns in
institutional investment portfolios. It emphasizes individual security characteristics
rather than portfolio properties, and it focuses on determining factors that influence
portfolio excess returns. The study uses five variables: percentage of institutional stock
holdings, systematic risk (represented by p), return volatility (represented by standard
deviation), firm size, and R&D expenditures. It investigates the causes of extra returns
from institutional portfolios without discriminating between types of institutions.
This study encompasses the following:
1. Compares the monthly return behavior of portfolios dominated by
institutional investors with portfolios dominated by individual or other
investors, such as an index fund.
2.

Examines portfolios to determine whether stock portfolios held in greater
percentage by institutional investors exhibit higher risk-adjusted rates of
return than those with less holdings by institutional investors.
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3. Tests whether institutional investors exploited the small firm effect in the
investment. (High returns from investments in small firms relative to
returns from investments in larger firms suggest that institutional investors
cautiously employed small firms, also, in their investment selection.)
4. Tests for market risk-retum relationship as implied by the CAPM. (In
other words, this study tests for a positive or negative relationship between
levels of risk and portfolio returns in the context of institutional ownership
of corporate stocks.)
3. Tests the relationship between individual stock volatility and institutional
portfolio returns. (This test makes it possible to see how the a-retum
relationship differs from the P-retum relationship.)
6.

Examines whether a firm’s R&D spending relates positively or negatively
to the rate of return in the institutional portfolio.

7. Jointly estimates the effects of the five factors (firm size, systematic risk,
volatility, R&D, and levels of institutional ownership) on portfolio returns
of institutional investors.

Chapter 2 reviews related theory, Chapter 3 reviews empirical studies, and
Chapter 4 reports the hypotheses. Chapter S describes the sample, data characteristics,
and the methodology used in the study. Chapter 6 presents the results of testing
procedures. Chapter 7 summarizes the study, presents conclusions, and
makes recommendations for further research.
Attributes of Institutional Investment Behavior
A recent study by Badrinath et al. (1989) found that institutional ownership is
positively related to firm size, firm beta (P), trading liquidity of a security,3 the number

trad in g liquidity was measired by the most recent year's annual trading volume in the firm’s
stock divided by the total number of shares outstanding.

J
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of years of exchange listing for the firm, and is negatively related to firm specific risk,
which is represented by stock volatility. Firm size, systematic risk and volatility were
found by Badrinath et al. to have a statistically significant relationship with institutional
ownership. The selection of variables for this study is based on the results of the
Badrinath et al. study. In addition, the research and development (R&D) expenditures
measure, which implies a firm's growth opportunity,4 is included in this study to see
how it is related to portfolio returns in terms of various institutional ownership.
In the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), P represents systematic risk which
cannot be eliminated by diversification. According to CAPM,5 the market compensates
systematic risk, but not total risk. Previous research has indicated that high-P funds
generally “outperformed" low-P funds relative to market-based portfolios of equal
systematic risk (McDonald, 1974).
Stock volatility, which represents the total risk of a security (or portfolio), can
be viewed as consisting of non-diversifiable risk (P) and diversifiable risk.

Non-

systematic risk represents the portion of an asset's risk associated with random causes
that can be eliminated through diversification. It is attributable to firm specific events,
*Long and Malitz (1983) and Titman and Wessels (1988) used R&D expenditures and advertising
as a proxy for the firm's growth opportunities.
SCAPM shows that the equilibrium rates o f return on all risky assets are a function of their
covariance with the market portfolio such that R., = ^ + (R„t ~
+ ■ Where RJt « the return
on security or capital asset j at time t, R ** the return on the market index, R* = the riskfree rate of
return, p{ = covariance (Rjt i R ^ f V c i r { R and eJt = abnormal return for security j at time t.
More details about the CAPM will appear in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5.
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such as strikes, lawsuits, regulatory actions, loss of a key account, and so forth. In this
study volatility (standard deviation) carries a broader conceptual meaning than
systematic risk.
The small-firm effect puzzled researchers for several years after discovery by
Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981). They observed that common shares of small firms
earned, on average, higher risk-adjusted returns than those of large firms. Later studies
showed that the small-firm effect occurred mostly in the first few trading days of
January.
Hansen and Hill (1991) established a positive relationship between levels of
institutional ownership and R&D expenditures. Two factors possibly explained this
relationship: (1) Institutional investors had the competence to make a rational decision
concerning share values (Heiner, 1983), and (2) many institutions effectively locked
themselves into their stock holdings (Aoki, 1984). Since then, researchers have sought
to determine whether greater R&D expenditures—with positive relationships to higher
holdings by institutional owners—had any relationship with the rate of return.
Institutional clients’ objectives vary. Some clients place their savings with
institutional investors to earn higher returns than they could obtain on their own. They
reduce risk by holding an interest in a large and varied pool of securities, and the
process allows a greater degree of liquidity (Pozen, 1994). Therefore, institutions
might have more advantages of economies of scale and professionalism than
individuals. If so, a higher R&D expenditure level relates positively to a greater rate
of return in the collective portfolio of institutional investors.
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According to the active investors' hypothesis (Jensen, 1991), institutions closely
monitor firm managers and the strategic management of the firm, and they have better
knowledge about the firms they select for their portfolios. Institutions typically do not
invest for the short term (Kochhar and David, 1996); rather, they look for long-term
benefits. The long-term orientation implies that institutional investors do not act in a
myopic manner, and that as superior investors, they seek to actively influence corporate
business decisions.
Perform ance o f Institu tion al Investment

and Efficient Market Hypothesis
Most performance evaluations of institutional investment over the last 30 years
focused only on mutual funds, because of the availability of accurate data (Bogle and
Twardowski, 1980). These studies focused on the evaluation of institutional investment
performance, particularly whether any investment strategy could consistently produce
results superior to the most “naive” strategy of simply holding the market portfolio.
The classic studies of the late 1960s generally concluded that mutual funds—after
deducting operating expenses, management fees, and brokerage commissions—
underperformed common market indices.6 These studies argued that with operating
expenses and brokerage commissions added back to the fund returns, mutual funds
produced a neutral performance.

In other words, actively managed investment

portfolios did not yield higher returns than those earned by randomly generated

6See Jensen (1968), Sharpe (1966), Treynor (1965), and Friend et al. (1962).
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portfolios. Previous researchers suggested that their evidence supported the “strong”
form of the efficient market hypothesis, which holds that current prices of securities
completely reflect the effects of all relevant information. Efforts to acquire and analyze
this information cannot produce consistently superior results. Therefore, they
characterized mutual funds' efforts to “beat the market” as futile.
There are few differences in the results on the mutual funds' performance
reported by the studies of the 1960s and 1970s. Some differences in the results
appeared.

McDonald (1974), Mains (1977), and Kon and Jen (1979) (MMKJ)

concluded that because of transaction costs and management fees, mutual funds as a
whole showed neither significantly “superior” nor “inferior” performance. Put another
way, the mutual funds were neutral performers. However, some managers had shown
superior ability in stock selectivity and market timing.7
Given the selected levels of systematic risk, managers in the mutual fund sample
in MMKJ did not consistently predict security prices well enough to outperform the
naive policy (combinations of the riskless asset and market portfolio) by a margin
sufficient to recoup all management fees and brokerage commissions. This finding is
consistent with the “strong” form of the efficient market hypothesis and the evidence
in Jensen (1968) or Kon and Jen (1979). MMKJ's results could not reject the idea that
mutual funds should abandon security selection and market timing activities in favor of

7Stock selectivity, which is known as “security analysis,” means mutual funds’ superior ability
to forecast price movements of selected individual stocks (i.e., micro forecasting). Market tining means
fund managers’ ability to foscast price movements of the general stock market as a whole (i.e., macro
forecasting).
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buy-and-hold policies. However, Mains (1977) began acknowledging the overall
superior selectivity performance o f the mutual fund managers through some
modification in Jensen’s methodology in the late 1970s.
More studies of the superior abilities of mutual funds' managers in selectivity
performance and market timing activity occurred in 1980s.8 Although more rigorous
studies with many different methodologies9 have attempted to rebut the evidence of the
first generation of studies, their common conclusions in the 1980s differed little from
those of the 1970s. Even though the later researchers discussed partial evidence
concerning mutual funds’ superior abilities, they found neither skillful market timing
nor clever security selection abilities in abundance in observed mutual fund return data.
Thus, they agreed with the general conclusion of the prior literature that mutual funds
could not, collectively, outperform a passive investment strategy.
In the 1980s, several studies on mutual funds' performance produced a modified
efficient market hypothesis (EMH) whereby only some investors (i.e., informed traders)
can afford the cost of collecting and acting on information. Hence these informed
traders will earn higher returns than passive investors, but their profits from stock
selection should only offset the costs of collecting information (Ippolito, 1993). This
revised EMH, as introduced by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), gives a different idea of

8See, for example, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Shawky (1982), Veit and Cheney (1982), Kon
(1983), Henriksson (1984), Chang (1984) Brinson, Hood and Beebower (1986), Grinblatt and Titman
(1989), and Ippolito (1989).
9Chang and Lewellen (1984) and Henriksson (1984) used parametric methods. Kon (1983) used
multivariate methods.

I
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EMH, emphasizing that security prices include all available information after a set of
active investors expends resources to ensure this result. After allowances for expenses
(and in equilibrium), the two investment strategies produce equal results. The market,
as a whole, benefits from the activity of active investors because when they act on new
information, others observe their actions, copy the actions, and thereby drive the
market toward values that incorporate all available information, even though not all
investors actually possess all information.
Those past studies have furnished partial evidence that some fund managers have
superior ability. However, the overall findings generally agree with the hypothesis that
actively managed mutual funds (net of expenses) do not perform significantly better
than index funds. This conclusion does not suggest that all fund managers efficiently
expend resources in search of new information all the time, nor does it suggest that
fund managers as a whole spend money wisely in every period.
Evidently, most of the previously mentioned studies utilize performance data of
mutual funds without using collective institutional investment performance data.
Therefore, those researchers did not determine whether industry-wide data would
produce results similar to those found in the individual studies using data for mutual
funds.
Flrm-Size Effect and Institutional

Holdings Relationship
Previous research has identified that institutional investors receive partial excess
returns, but has not identified the causes of those partial excess returns. One causal

.1
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factor may be the firm-size effect. Small-firm-effect research has thus far sampled data
for individual stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX and OTC markets. The results
indicate an inverse relationship between the market value of firms and their excess
returns.
This study samples securities partly or exclusively owned by institutional
investors in an attempt to determine whether institutional investors prefer small firms
to large firms in their portfolio construction. If so, institutional investors with greater
equity position in small firms would more likely maximize portfolio returns than those
with a strong equity position in the large firms.
Because institutional holdings and risk-adjusted average rates of return also vary
with firm size of the stock in the portfolio, some investigators looked at the relationship
between institutional ownership and firm size. Demsetz and Lehn (1985, p i 167) found
an inverse relationship between ownership concentration and firm size measured by the
market value of equity. Large firms exhibited a distinct separation between ownership
and control.

The large market value of the firms and the wide dispersion of

shareholdings meant that institutional owners could not hold a sizable percentage of a
given firm’s shares. The more-concentrated ownership structures of smaller firms,
however, may have facilitated relatively substantial institutional holdings of their stock.
Therefore, Demsetz and Lehn theorized a possible inverse relationship between firm
size and institutional ownership.
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A recent study by Hansen and Hill (1991) on the relationship between the levels
of institutional ownership and R&D spending reversed the previous views that
institutions invest for the short term (Chote and Linger, 1986; Drucker, 1986 in Hansen
and Hill). Most of the research that used financial data for the late 1970s and early
1980s had characterized institutional portfolio managers as myopic investors who prefer
to look at short-term stock prices. Consequently, that research had concluded that
firms owned significantly by institutional investors tended to reduce their R&D
spending. In the long term, reduced R&D spending would cause declining innovation,
low productivity, and reduced competitiveness (Thurow, 1985).
Kochhar and David (1996) rebutted this traditional view. They concluded that
institutional investors look for long-term benefits from their investments in the equity
of a firm. This study seeks to determine whether a positive relationship between
institutional holdings and R&D spending affects a portfolio's stock return.
Data Formation
This study utilizes monthly return data from January 1989 to December 1996
for stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and OTC which meet the following additional
criteria:
1. They must have data such as assets, stock price, and R&D expenditures
available on Compact Disclosure.
2. The stocks must be held by at least one institutional investor.
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This study employs a two-way grouping procedure to form portfolios for testing
purposes. The entire sample of firms is classified into five portfolios based on the
degrees of each of those variables.
For example, to test for firm size effects, the total assets of all firms are
calculated as of October of each year from 1989 to 1996. Firms are ranked on the basis
of their assets and placed into one of five portfolios. Hence, a small firm portfolio, a
large firm portfolio, and three intermediate firm portfolios are created. Second, the
monthly returns of firms within each portfolio are combined with equal-weights (//ft)
to calculate the monthly return of the portfolio. Those five portfolios are compared,
first, to each other (i.e., between a small firm group and a large firm group), and
second, to market returns to see if there are any abnormal risk-adjusted returns. Each
year new rankings are calculated, and the process is repeated. Two statistics, which
are Jobson and Korkie's (1981) transformed Sharpe measure as well as Sharpe measure
and Jensen's alpha measure, are applied to detect any firm size effect using these five
portfolio returns. Remaining variables follow the same procedure as the firm size test.
However, for institutional holdings and R&D expenditures variables, this study
employs another two-way grouping procedure to form portfolios. The entire sample
is classified based on the three levels of institutional holdings and three levels of R&D
expenditures. Group 1 contains stocks with the smallest percentage of ownership by
institutions, while groups 2 and 3 contain an equal number of firms with equally
increasing percentages of ownership by institutions' holdings.

.1
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Next, each subset portfolio is rearranged from high to low R&D expenditures
to form approximately three equal-sized data sets. The final step is to divide the data
set sample firms into three groups corresponding to the three levels of R&D
expenditures. Any stocks with negative book value or negative market value are
removed.
This procedure, which is similar to the procedure of Chan et al. (1991), results
in nine portfolio groups. This portfolio formation procedure is performed in October
of each of the years 1989 to 19% to reflect changes in the variable levels.
Two statistical tests are applied. One is Jobson and Korkie's (1981) transformed
Sharpe measure. The Jobson and Korkie’s method was useful in single comparison.
The other is Jensen's alpha measure based on the CAPM. Treynor measure, however,
will not be used in this test because this measure was inappropriate for investors who
have all of their assets in a portfolio (Jones, 1996).
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF RELATED THEORIES

Introduction
This study analyzes the performance of institutional investor portfolios relative
to other firm quality characteristics such as systematic risk (P), volatility, firm size, and
R&D expenditures. It examines the correspondence between institutional portfolio
performance and changes in percentage of institutional holdings of stocks. The basis
for this study derives from theories of an efficient market, mutual fund performance,
P analysis, volatility (a), firm size, and R&D spending, as well as previous empirical
research providing evidence supporting these theories.
This chapter briefly reviews EMH, institutional performance evaluation, P
constant, firm size, and R&D expenditures in terms of institutional investor stock
holdings.
Institutional Investor Holdings of Corporate

Stocks and Institutional Portfolio
Performance
Institutional investors represent one of the fastest growing

financial

intermediaries in the American economy. Pension funds, life and property-liability
insurance companies, investment companies, commercial banks, and other financial
17
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institutions exemplify these investors. Berle and Means called attention to the emerging
power of institutional investors in 1932, and institutional holdings of corporate stocks
have continually increased since then. The Federal Reserve (Szewczyk et al., 1992)
reported that institutional holdings of common stock increased from approximately 15%
of total outstanding equity in 1968 to over 30% in 1986. Recent research has examined
the role of institutional investors in an attempt to determine how large investment
institutions affected stock prices, firms’ investment behavior, portfolio returns,
executive compensation, and other aspects of market behavior.
EMH (Efficient Market Hypothesis)
In an efficient market, investors have a wide array of relevant information
available in a timely and low-cost manner. Security prices, therefore, reflect this
information quickly and fully.

Fama (1976) postulated three levels of market

efficiency: weak, semi-strong, and strong. Each gradation corresponds to the amount
of "available information” that the price reflects. According to the strong form of
EMH, prices fully and instantaneously reflect all available relevant information;
therefore, current prices provide accurate signals for capital allocations. This theory,
however, does not imply perfectly competitive capital markets or costless information.
Nor does it rule out some clever managers and some poorly performing ones (whether
by lack of skill or lack of luck); it merely implies vigorous competition in capital
markets.
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What if someone earns unusual returns after consideration of all transaction
costs, even over a long period of time? Does this imply market inefficiency? Then
why do anomalies occur even in an efficient market? Even fairly priced stocks
pose firm-specific risk that managers can eliminate through diversification. Therefore,
a professional portfolio manager with a well-diversified portfolio can still earn
consistently greater-than-normal returns through either skillful ability or luck, even in
an efficient market.10 However, not all mutual fund managers can earn abnormal
returns. This means only a small number of professional investment superstars can
consistently achieve superior performance.11
Do markets perform efficiently?

Yes.12 Most research on professional

managers’ risk-adjusted performances concludes that markets act efficiently, but
markets reward especially diligent, intelligent, or creative managers (Bodie et al.,
1996).

10For example, see Kon and Jen (1979).
"Peter Lynch, Warren Buffet, John Templeton, and John Neff are among those mutual fund
managers who have achieved a consistency o f superior performance over an extended period (Smith et
al., 1992; Bodie etal., 1996).
l2The strongly efficient markets hypothesis requires that security prices reflect all information;
in this formulation, even private information is available to the marketplace. Therefore, no one who
trades on short-term security price movements can earn a profit larger than what could be earned with
a naive buy-and-hold strategy. According to the strongly efficient market hypothesis, even those who
possess inside information would not be able to earn an abnormal profit from it.
However, some empirical studies show that corporate insiders and a small number of
professional investors can achieve consistently superior perfonmnce. In the efficient market theory, this
kind of observed phenomenon which, according to theory ought not to happen but indeed does happen,
constitutes an "anomaly."
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Ippolito (1993) introduced two approaches to a modem efficient market theory
(EMT). The traditional view on EMH (across all three forms) holds that security prices
already include all available information. The three forms of the EMH differ on the
information considered available to the market. This traditional view implies equal
returns across active and passive portfolios before subtracting trading and investment
expenses, thus rendering active trading counter-productive. The other, a relatively new
theory stressed by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), argues that investors have an incentive
to spend time and resources to analyze and uncover new information only if such
activity will likely generate higher investment returns to the investors engaging in such
private information creation and search. Thus, in market equilibrium, efficient
information-gathering activity should produce favorable results.
Those two approaches explain how information gets embedded in prices. The
EMT means that security prices include all available information after a set of active
investors expend resources to obtain and act on it.

The EMT means that, in

equilibrium, investments in active and passive portfolios produce equal results (net of
expenses).
Institutional Perform ance Evaluation

Because of the ready availability of data, financial analysts tend to use mutual
fund performance as a proxy for all institutional investment performance. As a result,
mutual fund performance has served as the basis for most of the historical review of
institutional performance discussed in this section.

i

J
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Ippolito (1993) raised doubt that mutual funds' performance results represent
the totality of institutional investors’ performance. Empirical studies do not yet address
Ippolito's conjecture. Friend, Brown, Herman, and Vickers (1962)~and later Fama
(1965)-conducted the first extensive and systematic study of mutual fund performance.
However, these early researchers did not consider risk in the measurement of
performance, so their studies did not provide appropriate empirical studies of mutual
fund performance.
Treynor (1963), Sharpe (1966), and Jensen (1968, 1969) conducted the mostcited studies on mutual fund performance. These models are called "one-parameter
performance measures,13” because these measures utilize one number that reflects both
risk and return simultaneously in the evaluation. The one-parameter studies made it
possible to rank performance data and compare them to a naive market standard. These
one-parameter measures use the CAPM as the basis of the models used in studying
mutual fund performance. However, these measures differ from the two parameters
in the CAPM, developed by Treynor (1961), Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), Mossin
(1966), and Fama (1968). CAPM takes an ex ante single-period model to forecast
expected rates of return for financial assets. However, the one-parameter measures
now serve as models for evaluations or rankings of portfolio performance.
Treynor (1965) devised a performance measure by relating portfolio excess
return to its systematic risk (P) through the CAPM equation. Treynor’s measure yields

13These measures, often referred to as the composite (risk-adjusted) measures of portfolio
performance, mean that portfolio performance measures combine return and risk into one calculation.
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return per unit of systematic risk.14 This measure, a reward-to-volatility ratio (RVOL),
provides a way to rate the performance of a fund’s investment managers. The slopes
of characteristic lines decide performance rates among funds. The slope of the
characteristic line measures the relative volatility of the fund's returns. The slope of
this line-the P-coefficient-measures die volatility of the portfolio's returns in relation
to those of the market index. Higher values of RVOL indicate better performance.
Jensen (1968) modified the characteristic regression line15to make it useful as
a one-parameter investment performance measure. Jensen’s measure focuses on
detecting fond managers' superior ability in selectivity, represented by alpha (a), in a
modified CAPM-based equation.16

A superior forecaster will tend to select

14Treynor's index ofportfolio performance, denoted \ for the p* portfolio is likely: — risk
premium/ systematic risk = (rp
where T and Rf are the average rate of return of portfolio p aid
risk-free rate, respectively. And jT is beta coe&cient of the portfolio.

15Sharpe (1963) developed a simplified model of portfolio analysis. While Sharpe called his
model the "diagonal model" and others have occasionally referred to it as the "single index model,” it
is now generally referred to as the "market model."
16Jensen's measure (1968, 1969) is based on die asset-pricing implications of the CAPM. If the
CAPM is true and security rates of return are multivariate normal, then the expected return on any
security (or portfolio), given the outcome of the market portfolio, is
(2- 1)

Where P, = covariance (RJt,Rmt)/f'ar(Rml), Rmt and R are the return on a market proxy and
risk-free rate in period t, respectively.
Assuming that the asset pricing model is empirically valid, equation (2-2) says that the realized
returns on any security (or portfolio) can be expressed as a linear function of its systematic risk, the
realized returns on the market portfolio, the risk-free rate and a random error, eJt, which has an
expected value of zero, where tilde denotes random variable.
(2-2)

By subtracting R« from both sides of equation(2-2), the excess return form
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underpriced securities; hence, the portfolio will earn more than the “normal” risk
premium for its level of risk. Estimating a regression based on the superior forecasting
ability of fond managers, therefore, generates a non-zero constant in the regression
equation, hi this case, alpha simply indicates the vertical distance from the ex post
CAPM. An alpha equal to zero indicates an equilibrium portfolio or asset. An alpha
greater than zero creates a larger expected return than one would anticipate on the basis
of the equilibrium relationship. An alpha less than zero signifies an overvalued
security. The appraisal ratio refines Jensen's measure and equals the ratio of Jensen's
a of the portfolio to the nonsystematic risk of the portfolio. It measures abnormal
return per unit of risk that holding a market index portfolio could eliminate through
diversification.

+

(2-3)

is obtained. The left-hand side of (2-3) isthe riskpremium earnedon the j* security (or portfolio).
As long as the CAPM isvalid, this risk premium is equalto Py(ifu -/?^ plus the random error
term e . Jensen's (1968, 1969) measure of mutual fund j's performance for period (observation) t is
+.................................................................................................(2-4)

Where a > 0 indicates that the security (or portfolio) has yielded a return in period t greater
than the return on a combined investment in the market portfolio and risk-free asset with the identical
level of systematic risk. This is possible because of a superior forecasting abilty not available to others.
Hence he will tend to systematically select securities which realize eJt > 0.
Therefore, Jensen (1968) allows for a nonzero constant in (2-4) by using the estimating equation

........................................................................ e-5)
Where the new error term £Jt will now have p., = 0, and should be serially independent (0,
a2). Equation (2-5) is called in this paper the ’Ynodified CAPM-based equation." 05 is the performance
measure, and Ps is assumed stationary. Thus if the portfolio manager has an ability to forecast security
prices, the intercept, eCj in (2-5) will be positive.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

f
24

Jensen’s measure, however, has one crucial weak point: when applied to a
multiperiod portfolio measure, it assumes a constant systematic risk through time to
satisfy the assumptions of the estimating equation. However, this may directly conflict
with the notion of a ‘‘managed” portfolio (Kon et al., 1979) because a mutual fund
manager’s ability relates closely to timing ability. This, in turn, means a non-constant
level of p, whereas Jensen's measure, "constant systematic risk," means a constant
level of p.
At approximately the same time that Treynor developed his measure, Sharpe
(1966) also developed a way of measuring portfolio performance. Sharpe’s measure
differs little from Treynor’s index, except that it divides the standard deviation of the
portfolio return into the risk premium.17 Sharpe’s measure, called a reward-tovariability measure (RVAR), divides Jensen’s measure by the standard deviation of the
return. It measures the excess return per unit of total risk. As with RVOL, the higher
the RVAR, the better the portfolio performance.
However, Miller and Gehr (1978) found an upward bias in Sharpe's index,
especially when it has a small (less than 50)sample size.18 Later, Jobson and Korkie
(1981) devised a statistical test (called a transformed difference) for measuring riskadjusted performance. Sharpe's portfolio performance measure does not provide a

I7Sbarpe's measure divides average portfolio excess return over the sample period by the
standard deviation of retumsover that period^It measures the reward to total volatility trade-off. $ =
risk premium/total risk = (r -jn /a ^ where rf = average return from portfoliop, Rf = riskless rate of
interest, and op — standard deviation of returns for portfolio p .
I8Tbis bias comes from Sharpe's sample variance estimator. For more detail, see Miller and
Gehr (1978).

I
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statistical decision on performance superiority. It simply provides numerical value.
However, this transformed Sharpe measure made it possible to provide statistical
properties of the traditional Sharpe's measure when using it for comparisons. This
transformed Sharpe measure proved beneficial even for small sample sizes.19
Jensen’s and Treynor’s measures can apply to any portfolio as well as to
individual securities; Sharpe’s measure, however, applies only to purportedly efficient
portfolios20 (Friend and Blume, 1970).21 This difference comes from their different
mathematical derivations.22 Jensen’s measure and the other two differ in another way.
Treynor's and Sharpe’s measures can apply to one-parameter portfolio rankings,
whereas Jensen’s measure cannot because it measures only vertical deviations from the

19Fbr example, a Z statistic based on transformed differences for Sharpe's measure behaved wel
even at small sample sizes. Jobson and Korkie (1981) devised a transformed Sharpe measure by
employing Taylor series expansions for approximations of estimators. This measure exhibits increased
statistical power when used for single comparisons. Chapter 5, the section on methodology, will deal
in more detail with Jobson and Korlrie's transformed Sharpe measure.
20An efficient portfdstn-com.wpdolio has either the smallest portfolio risk for a given level of
expected return or the largest expected return for a given level of risk. The efficient portfolio results
from combining the risk-free asset and market portfolio (M) on the efficient set.
2lInvestors who have all (or substantially all) of their assets in a portfolio o f securities should
rely more on the Sharpe measure than the Treynor measure. Sharpe's measure assesses the portfolio's
total return in relation to total risk, which includes any nonsystematic risk assumed by the investor.
However, for those investors whose portfolio constitutes only a (relatively) small partof their total assets,
systematic risk may well equal the relevant risk (Jones, 1996).
“ if portfolio i is an efficient portfolio, equation (2-1) in footnote 17 becomes
(E{Rm)-R/)/am=[E(.Ri)-Rfl/af ..................................................................................... (2-6)
because only in an efficient portfolio does p(/?,/?*) become one.
Equation (2-6) states that the excess return per unit of risk for an efficient portfolio equals the
excess return per unit of risk for die market portfolio. The right-hand side of equation (2-6) is the Sharp
index. This is a part of Sharpe's equation derivation. For more detail, see Sharpe (1964, 122) and
Friend and Blume (1970, 563).
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characteristic regression line. However, with a completely diversified portfolio, all
three measures agree on the ranking of portfolios. Many mutual fund studies for the
last 20 years have used these three one-parameter performance measures.
Most of the theoretical and empirical research in the 1960s focused on the
performance of micro forecasting portfolio managers (i.e., individual stock pickers).
Those empirical studies sought to determine whether, overall, mutual fund managers
achieved abnormal returns. They based their measurements on a mean-variance capital
asset pricing model framework that expressed the one-period excess return on security
i as in equation (2-5) in footnote 16.23 Alternatively, those researchers sought a
structural specification that would measure investment performance and identify
superior performers like Treynor and Sharpe (1966).
Much o f the mutual fund research in the 1970s and 1980s focused on
identifying details of abnormal returns rather than simply determining whether
managers achieved above-normal returns from their investment portfolios. Investment
portfolio research in the 1970's and 1980's tended to address one of the three following
areas: (1) forecasts of price movements of selected individual stocks (i.e., “micro
forecasting”), represented by a; (2) forecasts of price movements of the general stock
market as a whole (i.e., “macro forecasting”), represented by P; and (3) P-constant.

“ Carlson (1970), Jensen (1968), Kon and Jen (1979), Mains (1977), McDonald (1974), and
Sharpe (1966) are examples of research in this area.
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Since theories related to the first two areas related closely to each other, this section of
the study discusses these two areas, and the next section discusses P-constant theories.

Timing and Sriwtion Ability
A number o f studies have investigated mutual fund performance by looking at
selectivity and tuning.24 Those studies attributed superior performance to timing,
selection ability, or some combination of the two.
Selection Ability
Security selectivity decisions involve the forecasting of price movements of
individual common stocks. According to the security market line (SML) in the CAPM,
the market has underpriced a security lying above the SML. For its level of risk, it has
an expected return greater than that suggested by the SML as an “equilibrium” value.
Similarly, the market has overvalued a security located below the SML. For its level
of risk, it has a lower expected return than the corresponding CAPM “equilibrium”
value. Therefore, the system tests superior ability in security selectivity by looking at
the alpha distance as in (2-5) in footnote 17 above the SML in the CAPM. A positive
or negative alpha of a portfolio results from regressing the excess return of the fund's
portfolio against the excess return of the market portfolio. A portfolio manager with

^JenseaClfXiS, 1969), Kon and Jen (1979), Merton (1981), Henriksson and Merton(1981), Veit
et al. (1982), Grant (1982), Kon (1983), Henriksson(1984), Chang and Lewellen (19840, Admati et al.
(1986), Brinson et al. (1986), Jagaimathan and Korajczyk (1986), Breen and Jagannathan (1986)and Lee
and Rahman (1990) all constructed research dealing with timing or selectivity or both.
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superior forecasting ability who tends to select securities located above the SML will
earn more than the “normal” residual premium for the portfolio’s level of risk.
Allowance for such forecasting ability requires simply not constraining the
estimating regression equation to pass through the origin. A nonzero constant in the
market’s excess return regression creates a positive “alpha” in the excess return
regression; the positive alpha indicates superior selectivity talent on the part of the fund
manager. Most of this financial research utilized Jensen’s alpha (1966, 1968) measures.
Timing Ability
Market timing involves forecasting both general stock market price movements
and interest rates. More accurately, timing involves shifting funds between a market
index portfolio and a safe asset, such as Treasury bills (T-bills) or a money market
fund. The alternative chosen will depend on whether the forecaster expects the market
as a whole to outperform the safe asset. Additionally, it requires a decision to vary the
total systematic risk of the portfolio in response to expectations concerning the size and
direction of market price movements. Jensen (1968) suggested that a manager who
(correctly) perceives a high probability that market returns will increase in the next
period can increase portfolio return by increasing its risk. On the other hand, with an
expectation of a down market, the manager can reduce losses by reducing the risk level
of the portfolio. In the CAPM context, (3 manipulation represents timing ability.
The expected return of a portfolio depends on accurate estimates of not only
each security’s ait but also each security’s p;.

It also depends upon correct
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macroeconomic forecasts of average market rate of return (Aa)and risk-free rate (Rf).
However, since the manager can forecast Rf with relatively high confidence, market
timing basically refers to the average market rate of return forecast relative to the risk
free rate. The beta of the portfolio for a manager engaged in market timing should
increase in direct proportion to the quantity (Rm-Rp . This will, in turn, result in a
greater expected return for the portfolio.
Alexander and Francis (1986) showed that a manager can change the beta of the
portfolio in one of three ways. First, the manager can raise or lower the proportion of
the portfolio invested in the risk-free asset, depending on the market forecast. Here the
manager holds the relative composition of the risky portion of the portfolio fixed while
allowing its overall proportion to vary in lockstep with alterations in the risk-free asset
proportion (since the two proportions have to sum to 1). Second, while keeping
constant the proportion of the portfolio invested in the risk-free asset, the manager can
alter the composition of the portfolio’s risk. Given the goal of raising Pp, the manager
can sell low-P stocks and replace them with high-p stocks. The third method for
altering portfolio P simply utilizes some combination of the two previous methods.
Treynor and Mazuy (1966) pioneered the development of the curved
characteristic line by adding a squared term to the usual linear index model. For
example, an investor who can correctly predict bull and bear markets likely will shift
more funds into the portfolio in the early part of a bull market. This shift in funds will
make the portfolio characteristic line curve upward.
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Fama (1972) and Jensen (1972) developed theoretical structures for evaluating
an investment manager’s micro- and macro-forecasting performance. A comparison
between the ex post performance of the manager’s fund and market return provides a
basis for that evaluation. Jensen (1972) developed a method for identifying the separate
contributions of micro- and macro-forecasting. It requires an understanding of the
market-timing forecast, the portfolio adjustment corresponding to that forecast, and the
expected return on the market.
A number of researchers—Kon and Jen (1979), Admati et al. (1986), Henriksson
and Merton (1981), Connor and Korajczyk (1986), and Lee and Rahman (1990) among
others-have attempted to separate the micro-forecasting effects of investment managers
from macro-forecasting for the market as a whole. Using the Quandt switching
regression model and a CAPM framework, Kon and Jen (1979) examined the
possibility of changing mutual fond portfolio market-related risk levels over time. They
used a maximum likelihood test to separate their data sample into different risk
regimes, and then they ran the standard regression equation for each such regime.
They found evidence that many mutual funds had discrete changes in the level of
market-related risk chosen. This finding agreed with the view that managers of such
funds attempted to incorporate market timing into their investment strategies.
Admati et al. (1986) used the portfolio approach and the factor approach to
dichotomize between timing ability and the ability to select individual assets. The
portfolio approach restricts timing information to returns on a pre-specified set of
timing portfolios. This approach excludes selectivity information relating to timing
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portfolio returns, but it includes information about some other asset returns. The factor
approach utilizes timing information about the realization of factors that affect the
returns of many assets, but it does not restrict this information to pre-specified timing.
Selectivity under the factor approach allows for any specific determinants o f individual
asset returns without restriction.
Admati et al. (1986) developed two intuitive information characterizations:
(1) selectivity information statistically independent of returns on timing portfolios, and
(2) different types or coordinates of selectivity information applicable to different
assets. Merton (1981) proposed an equilibrium theory of value for qualitative forecasts
of whether stocks will outperform bonds. Based on Merton (1981), Henriksson and
Merton (1981) presented statistical techniques for testing forecasting ability with a
particular emphasis on the market-timing ability of investment managers.

They

presented both parametric and nonparametric tests of market-timing ability. The
parametric tests require the assumption of either the CAPM or a multifactor return
structure. Based strictly on observable returns, the tests permit identification of the
separate contributions from market-timing ability and micro forecasting.
Other studies on timing and selectivity included Fabozzi and Francis (1979),
Alexander and Stover (1980), and Lee and Rahman (1990). They all found at least
some evidence that mutual fund portfolios do not maintain a constant risk posture over
time, and they concluded that fund managers’ decision processes might include attempts
at market timing.
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Testing timing ability for fund managers requires a time-series analysis based
on specific performance data of institutional investors. As mentioned before, the test
of timing ability includes the alteration of the proportion invested in a portfolio’s risky
or safe assets. However, this study mainly focuses on measuring portfolio performance
of all institutional investors' selection ability, based on portfolio simulation. The test
of institutional investors’ timing ability lies beyond the scope of this study.

Beta (p) Analysis
Portfolio-P Constant
Most mutual fond performance evaluation research in the 1960s and early 1970s
typically employed a one-parameter risk/return benchmark like that developed by
Jensen (1968). Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972), as well as Blume and Friend (1973),
refined the analytical system.

Such investigations effectively focused on fund

managers’ security selection skills, and they assumed constant risk levels through time.
This assumption no longer suffices because mutual fonds with generally active
management should have a changing level of systematic risk as a result of the buying
and selling decisions of the fund managers. For example, a manager who can make
better-than-average forecasts of future realizations on market factors will likely adjust
to portfolio risk in anticipation of market movements. That manager can shift the
overall risk composition of the portfolio in anticipation of broad market price
movements. Kon and Jen (1978) regarded the risk level of a managed portfolio as a
decision variable resulting from timing activities.

j
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This study assumes that institutional portfolio managers are limited to selecting
stocks, not to timing the market. Managers' timing ability relates to beta-constant
portfolios. However, the study of portfolio beta-constant lies beyond the scope of this
study; this study assumes portfolio simulation at the individual stock's beta level rather
than at the portfolio's beta level. From this point on, therefore, this study will discuss
only literature concerning beta-constant individual securities.
Individual Stock-P Constant
Research often measures P, which represents systematic risk of an individual
stock, by applying ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to a time series of returns
of that individual stock paired against the market. This OLS model assumes a constant
beta through time in the regression expression. However, much research has attempted
to determine whether the systematic risk of an individual firm’s stock remained
constant. Much of this research has tested the constancy of common stocks’ betas.
Although one study has found a stationary beta, most evidence has indicated
nonstadonary Ps for individual securities. Examples of this work have included Blume
(1971,197S), Fabozzi and Francis (1977,1978), Sunder (1980), Bey (1983), Lee and
Chen (1982), and Ohlson and Rosenberg (1982).
The studies by Blume (1971, 1973) represented the pioneering work that first
subjected the concept of a constant beta to close empirical scrutiny. Based on sevenyear estimation periods, he found that beta tended to regress toward the grand mean of
unity. For example, a portfolio which had an extremely high estimated beta in one
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period tended to have a less extreme estimate in the following period. Blume concluded
that portfolio betas remained stable over relatively long periods, and that individual
stocks had unstable betas.
If a manager disregards non-constant betas in the risk-retum relationship, the
resulting estimate of beta may provide misleading performance information. Managers,
therefore, must pay attention to this beta constant. Previous research has developed
several different stochastic parameter models for non-constant beta, particularly a
random coefficient model and a first-order autoregressive process. The former model
states that each period's beta for a given stock represents a normally distributed random
variable with a mean of beta. The latter model tests for a first-order autocorrelation,
or whether the error in period t depends on the error in the preceding period. Fabozzi
and Francis (1978), Lee and Chen (1980), Alexander and Benson (1982), and Lee
(1982) used the random coefficient model. Sunder (1980) and Ohlson and Rosenberg
(1982) considered the first-order autoregressive model.
What causes a firm's systematic risk to change? Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes
(1970) conducted much of the research in this area. Their research indicated that
financial leverage changes, operating leverage, cash dividend yield, the degree of
cyclicality of firm revenues, and earnings growth contributed to systematic beta
changes. Rosenberg and Guy (1976a, 1976b) indicated that the change of beta may
have arisen through the influence of either microeconomic or macroeconomic factors.
They cited operational changes in the company or changes in the business environment
peculiar to the company as possible microeconomic factors; they suggested the rate of
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inflation, general business conditions, and expectations about relevant future events as
possible macroeconomic factors.
One study tested the hypothesis of constant beta coefficients. Brenner and Smidt
(1977) tested a specific non-constant beta model against a constant beta model. Their
study of 726 NYSE-listed securities supported the constant beta hypothesis.
The P-Return Relationship
Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Black (1972) developed the mean-variance
capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Other investigators have published studies on the
relationship between beta risk and average return in the securities markets; however,
not many of the studies have demonstrated any significant relation between beta and
average returns. Their beta risk represented the slope in the regression of a security’s
return against the market’s return, given the efficient market portfolio viewpoint.
Friend et al. (1970) published the first important study on the beta-retum
relationship. They studied 103 mutual fund performances based on the measure of risk
theoretically most appropriate for investors taking advantage of market diversification
opportunities. Their results showed a high positive correlation between mutual funds’
beta coefficients and average rates of return. Fama and Macbeth (1973) confirmed
these results in a test of the relationship between return and risk for NYSE common
stocks. Their study revealed a positive tradeoff between return and risk, as well as a
linear relationship between a security’s portfolio risk and its expected return.
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Using monthly returns in the period 1960-1969, McDonald (1974) studied the
risk and return relationship of 123 United States mutual funds. He found that the
market-based portfolio fund line sloped more steeply than the market line. He
concluded that high-beta funds generally “outperformed” low-beta funds for marketbased portfolios of equal systematic risk.25 Additionally, he found a positive
relationship between the market risk beta and average rate of return.
Some previous research has shown that beta risk and average rate of return do
not always have positive correlations, especially in a declining market. Shawky (1982)
found a negative correlation in the bear market risk-retum relationship of mutual funds.
His results also showed that the slope of the risk-retum relationship strongly depended
upon the market during the estimation period. A bull market or upward turn produced
a positive slope; conversely, a bear market caused a negative slope.
The Fama and French (1992) study of the 1963-1990 period and the Kothari et
al. (1993) study revealed a flat relationship between market beta and average return,
even with beta as the only explanatory variable. Chan and Lakonishok (1993) and
Black (1993) contradicted these results.
Badrinath et al. (1989) found a positive relationship between CAPM betas and
levels of institutional ownership. Holding a stock with a high beta increased the
expected return if the portfolio outperformed the market. The high beta meant stock

^Friend, Blume, and Crockett, (1970, 36) found that high-risk funds performed better than
lower-risk funds during the period studied. Chan and Lakonishok (1993) subsequently mentioned this
finding.
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price volatility and that when the market rose, the price of a high-beta stock moved up
even faster.
Even though portfolios with high beta stocks bear a “loss” in case o f sub-market
performance, institutional managers prefer higher beta stocks to lower beta stocks.
Despite their preferences for higher betas, institutional investors restrict their
investment activities to the stocks of firms with large market values. Those firms have
less-risky stocks than do firms with lower market values (Badrinath et al., 1989), and
they reduce the potential magnitude of loss in case of sub-market performances.
Sias (1996) presented an opposite theory on the relationship between stock
volatility and the institutional investor. Previous academic theory had argued that the
higher betas of riskier securities attracted institutional investors. Sias argued that
institutional investors played a destabilizing role in financial markets and that increases
in institutional holdings resulted in increased volatility.
Firm Size and Institutional Holdings
The small-firm effect is a market efficiency-related anomaly. According to Banz
(1981), the stocks of small NYSE firms tend to earn higher average risk-adjusted
returns than the stocks of large NYSE firms. Banz (1981) found that both total and
risk-adjusted rates of return tended to fall with increases in the relative size of the firm.
This size effect appears to have persisted for over forty years.
Reinganum (1981), using a sample of both NYSE and AMEX firms, also found
that returns on common stocks appeared to correlate negatively with the aggregate
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market values of the securities. Later studies-Keim (1983), Reinganum (1983), and
Blume and Stambaugh (1983)-showed that this small-firm effect occurred almost
entirely in the first two weeks of the year, thereby making it a “small-firm-in-January”
effect (Bodieetal., 1996).
Why have small stocks provided higher risk-adjusted returns than large stocks,
and why has the superior performance of small stocks occurred in January? Roll (1982)
suggested that the small-firm effect might result from improper estimations of security
betas.

Roll said that standard beta estimates derived from daily data seriously

understated the actual risk of a small firm. However, Reinganum’s research (1982) did
not support Roll’s conjecture on the firm size effect. He concluded that although the
direction of the bias in beta estimation agreed with Roll’s argument, the small-firm
effect occurred nevertheless, even after controlling for trading frequency.
Another explanation of the small-firm effect came from liquidity theory as
researched by Amihud and Mendelson (1989). They performed a joint test with all the
variables-systematic risk (P), residual risk, size, and the bid-ask spread—hypothesized
to affect expected returns. Their argument started with the proposition that the expected
return increased with the asset’s systematic risk, residual risk, and market value; it
decreased with the number of investors who had access to information about it and who
invested in it. They found a highly significant bid-ask spread and a negligible size
influence. Smaller stocks had larger bid-ask spreads, and the bid-ask spread dominated
size in a joint test of the two variables' relationships to return.

.i
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importance only because smaller stocks had lower liquidity, and, therefore, larger bidask spreads.
Keim (1983, 1986) and Roll (1983) found that roughly half of the size effect
occurred in January, and more than half of the excess January returns occurred during
the first five trading days of that January. The first trading day of the year showed a
high small-firm premium in every year of the period studied. Ritter (1988) attributed
this small-firm-in-January effect to income tax-related individual investor behavior.
Individuals owned large proportions of small stocks, and, as the end of the year
approached, they sold stocks held at a loss in order to receive a tax benefit. They
reinvested in January, creating buying pressure that pushed the prices of small stocks
upward. The low buy/sell ratio for individual investors in late December and the high
buy/sell ratio early in the following January provided evidence of this pattern.
R&D Expenditure and Institutional H oldings

As institutional investors increased their percentage ownership of the voting
stock of publicly traded companies, they influenced these firms’ operations (Pozen,
1994). Stock analysts have sought to determine whether publicly traded companies’
R&D expenditures have undergone any systematic changes and whether those changes
have influenced stock prices. Three mutually exclusive viewpoints evolved concerning
the effects of R&D expenditures (Kochhar and David, 1996). The first view (Drucker
1986, Mitroff 1987) treated institutional investors as “myopic” investors looking for
short-term gains from their equity investments. The second view considered institutions

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

f
40

as interested in long-term gains from their investments, so these investors sought and
invested in more innovative firms. Allen (1993), Jarrell et al. (1985), and Jensen
(1988) supported this perspective. The third view (Aold 1984, Taylor 1990, Useem
1993) considered that the large holdings of these investors provided them with an
incentive to monitor firm managers and influence firm actions if necessary. Thus, selfinterest motivated institutional investors to use their “voice” to influence managerial
decisions, with the goal of increasing firm value.
The view that institutions invested for short-term gains received extensive
support during the late 1980s. However, increasing levels of institutional ownership
made it difficult for institutions to simply follow an “exit” policy of selling a stock
when dissatisfied with its performance. This policy entailed increasingly more expense
as institutions bad to accept substantial discounts in order to liquidate their significant
holdings (Coffee, 1991). The enormous level of assets controlled by institutions made
efficient movement in and out of stock positions increasingly difficult (Nussbaum et al.,
1987). Those movements would entail commissions when liquidating positions at lower
prices and still more commissions when reinvesting the proceeds.

Institutional

investors, therefore, started involving themselves in corporate strategy. The last two
theories-explaining how institutional investors acted as long-term investors-have
recently gained more acceptance than the first one, the "myopic theory" (Kochhar and
David, 1996; Hansen and Hill, 1991).

J
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

It
41

Sum m ary

Several theories have appeared in the literature to explain the evaluation of
mutual fund performance. EMH, timing and selection ability, beta constant, betaretum relationship, firm size effect, and level of R&D expenditures each have offered
insights into the causal factors creating excess returns for institutional investors'
portfolios. The next chapter will review previous empirical studies in those areas.
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CHAPTER 3
REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE

IntnHhKftffl
This chapter reviews relevant empirical studies. Section one examines literature
on mutual fund performance. Section two examines the evidence concerning beta
effects on portfolio performances. The first part deals with the beta constant relation
to the systematic risk of a firm, and the second part deals with the beta-retum
relationship. Section three reviews evidence concerning the effect of firm size on
return analysis. The final section reviews empirical evidence that seeks to explain
relationships between levels of institutional holdings and R&D expenditures.
Mutual Funds Perform ance
As institutional holdings of corporate stocks have increased, a number of
researchers have attempted to evaluate the performance of institutional portfolios. No
clear consensus has been attained about performance evaluation. Some researchers
have concluded that actively managed mutual funds outperformed index funds, while
others have judged that index funds outperformed mutual funds. The latter opinion
appears to have more acceptance.

42
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Mutual funds tend to perform less efficiently than market indexes because of
load fees, management fees, brokerage fees, and unreasonably established benchmarks
for comparisons. A summary evaluation of mutual fund performance follows.
Most early researchers-including Treynor (1965), Sharpe (1966), and Jensen
(1968,1969)-utilized a one-parameter risk-adjusted measurement of portfolio manager
performance.

These researchers presumed that those managers acted as

microforecasters, or individual stock pickers. The early investigators searched for
evidence of superior mutual fond investment performance in terms of individual stock
selection ability. Their common results revealed that mutual funds performed below
the benchmark portfolio, or the naive portfolio strategy. Sharpe found a lower (0.34)
reward-to-volatility (RVOL) ratio26 for his sample than for the Dow Jones Industrial
Index. Jensen found a -.011 average value of alpha, calculated net of expenses. This
indicated that the funds earned about 1.1% less per year (compounded continuously)
than they should have earned, given their level of systematic risk.
Treynor and Mazuy (1966) introduced a nonlinear version of CAPM to test for
market timing ability. In the standard CAPM regression equation, a portfolio’s return
has a linear relationship with the market return. However, Treynor and Mazuy argued
that a manager who could forecast market returns would hold a greater proportion of
the market portfolio in stocks with a high return. Their portfolio return exhibited a
convex relationship to the market return. Their study showed no statistical evidence

^TlVAR ratio = (average return - 3.0%)/variability. For mote defeil, see Sharpe (1966, 125).
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that investment managers of any of fifty-seven open-end mutual funds successfully
outperformed the market.
Soon after publication of the one-parameter measure, Friend, Blume, and
Crocket (1970) studied 103 mutual funds for the 1960-1968 period. They applied a
risk-class approach27 to overcome the bias inherent in the one-parameter risk-adjusted
approach.28 Their results also confirmed previous findings. Their random portfolios
of NYSE stocks performed better on average than did mutual funds with equal
investment in each stock and in the same risk class. Friend et al. (1970) attributed the
inferior performance of mutual funds to unreasonably established benchmarks plus the
effects of both mutual fund management fees and commissions.
McDonald (1974), Mains (1977), and Kon and Jen (1979) used the oneparameter model with data from the late 1950s and the 1960s in studying the investment
performance of mutual fund management. Although some individual funds performed
in a superior manner, the mutual fund sample showed neither significantly “superior”
nor significantly “inferior” performance. Kim (1977) found a negative relationship

27This approach generated random portfolios of various sizes with equal dollar weights or with
market value weights at the beginning of the evaluation period. It held such portfolios to the end of the
evaluation period. To evaluate the performance of managed funds, it classified both the random
portfolios and managed portfolios by predetermined risk classes.
In each risk class, it compared y (the mean return on the managed portfolios) to that on the
random benchmark portfolios in order to determine which group performed better (Kim, 1978).
28The risk-adjusted benchmark portfolio approach tended t> evaluate unfavorably the funds which
assumed risk greater than the market portfolio in some periods and the reverse in other periods. This
effect occurred because the benchmark portfolios, generated by applying realized return data to the
CAPM, tended to produce "unreasonably" high returns for the muual funds with above-average risk and
"unreasonably” low returns for the funds with below-average risk (Friend and Blume [1970] as cited in
Kim [1978, 387]). See Friend and Blume (1970) for details.
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between risk and return. The reverse fond relationship is attributed to managers who
had invested too much in risky growth stocks during the bear market.
Research on mutual funds during the 1980s shifted from evaluating overall
performance to understanding the details of superior performance. Many of those
studies examined the market-timing performance of mutual fond managers.
Jensen’s Alpha Measure (1966, 1968) prepared the foundation for most of the
research about mutual fund manager selection skills. Jensen (1968) argued that if a
manager successfully predicted market movements and altered portfolio compositions
appropriately, the portfolio risk estimate is forced downward and the associated
measure of risk-adjusted performance (alpha hat) is forced upward. Grant (1977)
reexamined Jensen’s contention. He explained how market-timing actions affected
selection-ability empirical test results. His research (1977) reversed Jensen’s argument
that as upwardly biased estimates of least-squares estimators of beta, performance
estimates are biased downwardly. By ignoring timing, the previous researcher had
biased portfolio alpha estimates downward. Grant traced that timing-related downward
bias to a mathematical error in Jensen’s report and a conceptual problem involved in
Jensen's (1968) work. He showed that market-timing made the portfolio alpha’s
regression estimate a downward-biased measure of excess returns resulting from micro
forecasting ability. Chang and Lewellen (1984), Henriksson (1984), and Lee and
Rahman (1990) supported Grant’s findings.
Financial researchers, nevertheless, continued to employ Jensen measures.
Lehmann and Modest (1987) examined monthly-returns data for 130 mutual funds over
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the January 1968 through December 1982 period. They utilized Jensen’s measures to
determine the sensitivity of inferences about performance to the benchmark chosen to
measure normal performance. Their study did not determine whether mutual funds
achieved abnormal performance. However, the measures of abnormal mutual fund
performance showed considerable sensitivity to the benchmark chosen to measure
normal performance.29 Grinblatt and Titman (1989) used Jensen’s measures to identity
mutual fund managers who exhibited superior stock selection abilities. They studied
quarterly equity holdings data for a large sample of mutual funds that operated derring
part or all of the 1975-1984 period. Like Lehmann and Modest, they concluded that
abnormal return measurement benchmarks influenced performance evaluations.
Although some fund managers turned out to be superior performers, high operating
expenses offset superior performance. Their actual returns, therefore, did not exhibit
abnormal performance.
Lee and Rahman (1990) employed the Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer model based
upon Jensen measures (1972). They produced no evidence of overall superior micro
fund manager ability, except at the individual fund level.

29However, an early study by Peterson and Rice (1980) says the choice of an index or measure
does not appear to affect the relative rankings of the portfolios. Peterson and Rice calculated quarterly
returns for 15 mutual funds over two five-year observation periods, 1967-1971 and 1972-1976. They
utilized four proxies for the market portfolio: the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the Standard and Poor’s 500
Stock Index, and two indices representing an equal-weighted and a value-weighted index of all NYSElisted common stocks. Peterson and Rice found that for the Treynor measure, choice of market proxy
made little difference in ranking the performance of the portfolios.
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P A nalysis

Beta Constant
Much past research has tested hypotheses about the instability of common
stock’s systematic risk, by beta. Many of the tests used ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression estimates of individual stock risks over consecutive time segments. In most
cases, least-squares beta estimates, which represented individual common stock market
risk levels, used either a market model (i.e., an actual) or a revised traditional CAPM
(i.e., an expectation) in a standard linear regression model.
The latter model originally represented the expected one-period return of any
security or portfolio, given its level of systematic risk beta. Empirical applications of
the CAPM required additional assumptions (a statistical generating process) for actual
rates of return. Fama (1968) and Jensen (1968) provided a framework for applying the
expected single-period model of CAPM to ex post multiperiod returns. This process
yielded a result approximately equal to the coefficient beta (pj) in the “market model”
given by:

y=i,2,....jv

where the “Pj” parameter may have varied from security to security, an unobservable
“market factor”, xt , (to some extent) affecting returns on all securities, and N
representing the total number of securities in the market (Jensen, 1968).
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Blume (1971) conducted the first reported study of beta stability. He found a
product moment correlation of .63 for single securities for two time periods (July 1926
through June 1933, and July 1933 through June 1940).30 Levy (1971) used monthly
prices and successive seven-year periods to examine the longer-term stability of the beta
coefficient. He observed unstable betas of individual stocks, and warned that past betas
for individual securities did not provide good estimates of future risk. Fabozzi and
Francis (1978), Kon and Jen (1979), Sunder (1980), Ohlson and Rosenberg (1982), Lee
and Chen (1982), Kon (1983), Bos and Newbold (1984), Simonds et al. (1986), Collins
et al. (1987), and Rahman et al. (1987) researched systematic risk (P) stability for
individual securities.
Fabozzi and Francis (1978) used monthly returns of NYSE stocks traded from
196S to 1971 to examine the beta coefficient stability. They concluded that individual
security betas moved randomly, while the OLS31 beta acted as an invariant point
estimate over the sample period. Bos and Newbold studied stability of systematic risk
during the 1970s and found results similar to Fabozzi and Francis; they used monthly
return data of NYSE-listed stocks and observed strong random systematic risk.
Kon and Jen studied the beta stability of individual stocks contained in portfolios
of 49 mutual funds. They used Quandt’s switching regression model and monthly

30This correlation suggested that assessments for individual securities derived from historical data
could explain roughly 36 percent of the variation in the future estimated values leaving about 64 percent
unexplained (Blume, 1971).
3'By definition, the OLS method estimates the average slope, and also by definition, that average
is invariant over the data range.

.1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

I1
49

return data from the 1960-1971 period; they found that 27 of 49 funds showed multiple
regimes and that 6 funds showed 3 regimes. Kon (1983) tested 1960-1976 data for
mutual funds and found the same non-constant beta of individual funds.
Sunder used 1926 to 1975 monthly return rates for NYSE stocks in testing
individual stock market risk. He had mixed results. The beta coefficient followed a
random walk over time, and it followed an autoregressive process. The average non
constant level varied from high during the 1926 to 1950 period to low during the 1963
to 1975 period. Ohlson and Rosenberg (1982), as well as Sunder (1980), used NYSEtraded common stocks to test individual stock stability. They discovered a tendency for
betas to converge rather slowly toward a norm (the stationary mean) as well as a
stationary first-order autoregressive process that produced wide divergences about the
mean value. Most of the studies used monthly-based rates of return.
Collins et al. (1987) used NYSE and AMEX weekly return data for 500
individual securities and for several different time intervals within the 1962-81 period.
As previous researchers have proved, they observed stochastic variation in the beta risk
of equity securities. Their findings are quite persuasive for 10-year estimation periods
and persist for estimation periods as short as 5 years.
Brenner and Smidt (1977) found support of the constant beta coefficient
hypothesis. Alternative specific non-stationary beta coefficients implied a constant
absolute amount of risk.32 Their study consisted o f762 NYSE-listed stocks with CRSP

32Their model used the following relation between the beta of a security and the value-V of the
underlying asset
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data for 120 consecutive months ending in June, 1968. They developed and used four
specific comparative CAPM-based market models and applied Chow Test coefficient
equality in two time periods. They compared the two null hypotheses: constant relative
risk and constant absolute risk. Brenner and Smidt found no dramatic difference
between the two hypotheses; the slight difference that they found tended to favor the
constant beta coefficient hypothesis. Brenner and Smidt interpreted the difference as
meaning that the market models incorrectly specified the data generating process.
The B-Return and p-Institutional

Holding Relationships
Early CAPM studies supported a positive relationship between beta risk and
average rate of return. Recent studies, however, have not supported that relationship.
Black, Jensen, and Scholes (BJS, 1972) investigated the relationship between risk and
return. They used 1931 through 1965 monthly returns from nearly all NYSE stocks.
Their findings supported the traditional form of the CAPM relationship: the higher the
portfolio p, the larger the portfolio excess return. The most volatile and least volatile
portfolios had 1.56 and .5 betas, respectively; their corresponding portfolios had
monthly returns of 2.13 and .91 respectively.

p = B/v
where B represents the risk of the real asset, and p measures the amount of risk per dollar of value. The
quantity of B measures the absolute amount of risk associated with the asset. If the absolute amount of
risk associated with the asset remains constant when the value of the asset changes, beta will vary in
inverse proportion to variations in the value of the asset (Brenner and Smidt, 1977).
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Fama and MacBeth (1973) examined the risk-retum relationship of CAPM
from 1935 to 1968. They regressed monthly returns for twenty portfolios against the
values of explanatory variables.

Their study provided evidence of a positive

relationship between systematic risk and the rate of return. Fama and MacBeth
produced a significant market premium for the entire study period.
Recently, Fama and French (1992) proclaimed beta’s death; they could discern
no relationship between market beta and average return. Their sample included all
nonfinancial firms in the combined NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ return files. They
merged CRSP and COMPUSTAT annual income-statement and balance-sheet data for
the 1963 to 1990 period. They formed ten portfolios based upon the ranked market
betas of stocks. They concluded that the highest beta portfolio had the lowest average
return, and that the highest average returns occurred in the third beta portfolio.
Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (1995) sought to determine whether annual beta
explained cross-sectional variations in average returns over three different study periods
between 1927 and 1990. They presented evidence of substantial ex post compensation
for beta risk over the 1941 - 1990 period and even more over the 1927 - 1990 period.
Consistent with evidence in Fama and French, they found weak estimated risk
premiums for the 1963 -1990 subperiod; they saw no relationship between beta risk
and average return over the relatively short period of time. Although they used
monthly return data for average returns, they applied annual estimates of beta to reduce
the size effect coming from the small-firm January effect.
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Using 1931 - 1965 data, Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) observed higher
monthly returns for low-risk NYSE stocks than the CAPM would predict. McDonald
(1974), however, found that high-beta funds outperformed low-beta funds in a study
based on 123 American mutual funds during the 1960 - 1969 study period.
Using a 1977 - 1991 sample of all securities listed on the NYSE, Sias (1996)
investigated the relationship between volatility and institutional holdings of corporate
stocks. He found that institutional investors played a destabilizing role in financial
markets.

He concluded that increased institutional holdings of corporate stocks

preceded increased individual stock volatility. Sias regressed the natural logarithm of
volatility in each year against the change in institutional holdings in the previous year.
The coefficient associated with changes in institutional holdings proved positive (and
significant at the 5% level) in every year.
Firm Size and Institutional Holdings
Most of the fourteen previous studies proved a firm-size effect in one or both
of these ways: (1) they found an inverse relationship between average rate of return and
corporate market values (Brown et al., 1983), or (2) they found a linear relationship
between the two (Banz, 1981). Most of that research showed that the firm-size effect
occurred in January.
Banz (1981) studied the empirical relationship between returns and total market
values of NYSE common stocks. He used the monthly returns of all NYSE stocks
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from 1926 to 197S. Banz found that smaller firms had higher risk-adjusted returns than
medium size portfolio returns or the largest portfolio.
Reinganum (1981) stated that the firm size effect resulted from either
misspecified CAPM or inefficient capital markets. Reinganum used quarterly and
annual earnings data for 566 NYSE and AMEX stocks traded in 1976 and 1977. He
attributed persistent abnormal returns to the misspecified equilibrium pricing model.
He traced those abnormal returns to flaws in the capital asset pricing model, rather than
to informational inefficiencies.
Roll (1981) argued that part of the observed risk-adjusted excess returns related
to size resulted from improper estimations of security betas, rather than to inadequate
empirical representation of capital market equilibrium. Reinganum (1982), however,
did not support that argument. Reinganum based his research on NYSE and AMEX
trading data, and he used average daily returns from the 1964 - 1978 study period.
Then he used monthly and quarterly returns to estimate betas. The estimated daily
return beta of the small firm portfolio produced a 1.69 coefficient, while it produced
1.47 and 2.0 coefficients, respectively, for quarterly and monthly data. He proved that
misestimation of beta could not explain the firm size effect.
Banz, Brown et al. (1983) tested firm size effect using all stocks traded on the
NYSE and AMEX from 1976 to 1978.33 They found a linear size effect between mean
returns and firm size.

33For details, see Brown et al. (1983, 40).
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A great deal of research has sought to determine potential explanations of
stochastic size effects. Keim (1983) used CRSP daily files for all securities traded on
the NYSE an AMEX from 1962 to 1978. He discovered that daily abnormal return
distributions in January had larger means relative to the remaining eleven months, and
he noticed a more pronounced size effect in January than in any other month. He
introduced a tax loss selling hypothesis to explain this phenomenon. Lakonishok and
Shapiro (1986), Jaffe et al. (1989), Ritter and Chopra (1989), Leong and Zaima (1991),
and Elfakhani (1993)-among others—corroborated the January small firm effect.
No published work on the relationship between institutional holdings of
corporate stocks or mutual fund performance and firm size effect was found. However,
Tsetsekos and DeFusco (1990) studied portfolio performance in terms of the
relationship between managerial ownership and the size effect. They designed their
study to see whether portfolios of firms with high managerial ownership outperformed
portfolios of firms with low managerial ownership. According to their study, the
smallest firm portfolio earned a significant positive abnormal return of .8% per month;
the largest value firm portfolio earned a significant negative .2% abnormal return per
month.

They agreed that the small-firm effect did influence abnormal returns.

However, the level of managerial ownership did not appear to have an effect on
portfolio returns; portfolios constructed to control for the size effect exhibited riskadjusted returns unrelated to the degree of managerial ownership.
Most of the financial analysts who tried to isolate superior ability and above
normal rates of return limited the scope of their research to fund managers' stock
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selection abilities and market timing abilities. (Stock selection ability consisted of
selecting stocks of small firms which outperform the market, selecting stocks with high
betas which outperform the market, and other factors.)
R&D Expenditure and Institutional
Holdings

Sias (1996) argued that institutional ownership increased stock price volatility,
while others (Dobrzynski et al., 1986; Drucker, 1986) suggested that it induced a
myopic short-term management orientation. Past institutional investor evaluations
generally centered on financial performance measures (Graves and Waddock, 1990).
Institutional investment managers, therefore, attempted to influence short-run strategies
of companies in their portfolios. Graves (1988) studied institutional investor-R&D
spending relationships for twenty-two computer manufacturing companies. He found
a negative relationship between R&D expenditures and institutional ownership; high
levels of institutional ownership may have suppressed R&D spending in the computer
industry. Because of intense pressure to produce short-term earnings, institutional
investors likely influenced companies in their portfolios to avoid major long-term
investments such as R&D expenditures. They simply considered themselves traders,
not investors, and they eagerly sold stocks for quick profits (Dobrzynski, 1986). As
the levels of institutional ownership have increased, annual stock turnover rates34 have

tu rn o v e r equals the fraction of a firm’s capital traded on a given day as measured by the price on
day t, multiplied by the volume on day t, and then normalized by dividing by year-end capitalization.
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also increased dramatically, from 16% in 1965 to 54% in 1985 (Graves and Waddock,
1990).
Management literature has attributed declining innovation, poor productivity
growth, and a loss of international competitiveness (Scherer 1984 and Ttaurow 1985)
to institutional investors' orientation toward short-term profits. Institutional investors
now recognize the folly of that orientation and the “exit” policy of dumping a given
stock because of dissatisfaction with managerial performance. The cost of such a
practice has increased greatly because they have had to accept substantial discounts in
order to liquidate their significant holdings (Aoki, 1984). Institutions now own more
than 50% of U.S. equities (Mallin, 1995); their investment managers now must concern
themselves with both short-term and long-term results.
Recent studies by Hansen and Hill (1991) and Kochhar and David (1996)
showed a significant positive relationship between institutional holdings and both long
term investment and R&D expenditures. Hansen and Hill used 129 firms in four
research-intensive industries over a ten-year period. Kochhar and David used 1989
financial data for 135 manufacturing firms traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ. The results indicated that institutions did not foster short-term orientation
and that they may have influenced firms to increase innovation.
Heiner (1983) posited another reason for the positive relationship between R&D
spending and institutional holdings. His theory-referred to as the competencedifficult gap (the C-D gap)-explained the ability of shareholders to make rational
decisions concerning share value. The gap measured the spread between an economic

i
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actor's competence to make a rational decision and the difficulty of the decision
problem. Individual shareholders had a wider gap than did institutions. Hansen and
Hill (1991) explained that individual shareholders had a limited ability to make difficult
decisions in a complex environment characterized by substantial noise. This gap theory
suggested that the wider C-D gap may have led to buy and sell decisions on the basis
of short-term earnings. Since institutions systematically processed information better
than individuals, the decisions of institutional investors probably led to more nearly
rational decisions oriented toward long-term investments.
Summary

Sharpe's measure, still frequently used by financial researchers, will be applied
to test the selection ability of institutional investors. Then, as factors affecting the
selection ability o f institutional investors, the CAPM based B-retum relationship, the
firm-size effect, and R&D expenditures will be studied to ascertain whether they exhibit
any relationship with institutional investors' excess returns. The CAPM based betaretum relationship is one of the top issues currently being discussed by financial
analysts. The relationship between beta and rate of return will be tested in this study.
The next chapter discusses the five hypotheses addressed in this study. Previous
empirical research has not specifically analyzed these formal hypotheses.

j
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CHAPTER 4
HYPOTHESES
Introduction
Since the 1930s institutional investors, such as banks, insurance companies, and
investment counselors, have acquired increased concentrations of publicly traded
stocks. Even though investors could have done better by buying index funds, the size
of institutional investors has continued to grow each year.
Gruber (1996) developed a clientele behavior classification system to explain
this phenomenon. He classified one group as "sophisticated" clientele and the other as
"disadvantaged” clientele. The sophisticated group directs its money to funds based on
performance.

He divided disadvantaged clientele into three sub-groups:

(1) unsophisticated investors, (2) institutionally disadvantaged investors, and (3) tax
disadvantaged investors. Gruber concluded that unsophisticated investors directed their
money to funds based at least in part on other influences, such as advertising and advice
from brokers. Disadvantages institutional investors consisted of pension accounts
which contained assets that underperformed. Tax disadvantaged investors held funds
until capital gains taxes made liquidation infeasible. This group could have acted as
sophisticated investors in placing new money.
58
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As yet, no one has analyzed the ability of institutional investors to collectively
earn abnormal returns. Investors need to know whether a stock portfolio with a high
level of institutional investor ownership will show a greater return than one with a
lower level of institutional investor ownership. They also need to know whether the
the small-firm effect theory still applies to the evaluation of institutional investors.
Following are five hypotheses relating to return characteristics for institutional
investors. The investigation includes cross-sectional analysis of institutional investment
portfolio equity returns.

Hypothesis!
These tests will examine gross returns that have no transaction costs, fees, or
other expenses. Different institutional investors have different transaction costs or fees,
and this test utilizes portfolios formed by several criteria that make it difficult to trace
stock ownership to institutional investors.
Hoi:

Mean risk-adjusted excess returns of stock portfolios do not correlate
positively with institutional investor concentration percentages.

Hoi:

Mean risk-adjusted excess returns of stock portfolios have a positive
correlation with institutional investor concentration percentages.

Hypothesis 1 addresses the first purpose of this study. It attempts to determine
whether portfolios with higher concentrations of institutional investors exhibit greater
return rates than those with lower holdings. It also attempts to ascertain whether they
systematically produce returns above those estimated by the CAPM.

i
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

I

60

Rejection of null Hypothesis 1 will imply that stock portfolios with high
concentrations of institutional investors exhibited different risk-adjusted rates of return
than those with low holdings by institutional investors. Higher risk-adjusted rates of
return may indicate that the institutional investors had superior selection ability.
Failure to reject the null hypothesis will indicate that institutional investors collectively
did not evaluate investments any better than other investors. Some institutional
investors may have done better while others did worse.

Hypothesis 2-fltelated to P Risk)
Ho2:

Stock portfolios with higher p risk do not exhibit greater risk-adjusted
abnormal rates of return than those with lower P risk for market-based
portfolios of equal systematic risk.

Ht2:

Stock portfolios with higher P risk exhibit greater risk-adjusted
abnormal rates of return than those with lower beta risk for marketbased portfolios of equal systematic risk.

Hypothesis 2 (null and alternative) addresses the second purpose of this study.
It attempts to determine whether stock portfolios with higher market risks, represented
by higher Ps, produced higher rates of return than those with lower p risks as implied
by the CAPM. Testing this hypothesis will indicate whether the compensation for
systematic risk equaled or exceeded the market rate of return less the risk-free rate (rmrf), as stated by the CAPM. This excess returns test will determine whether high-p
stock portfolios systematically earned more than the required return estimated by the
CAPM. It examines the relationship between p and mean excess return. Ultimately,

j
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the test of this hypothesis will determine the appropriateness of the stock risk measure,
PRejection of null Hypothesis 2 will lead to the conclusion that institutional
investors manifested their superior ability by selecting stocks with a higher p. It could
mean that institutional investors required a higher return for holding a stock with a
larger p, which would suggest that institutional investors considered the P factor a
useful mol in forecasting security risks. It could also mean that P played an important
role in stock pricing.
Hypothesis 3 (Related to Volatility)
Ho3:

Stock portfolios with higher volatility do not exhibit greater or less rates
of return than those with lower volatility.

H„3:

Stock portfolios with higher volatility exhibit greater or less rates of
return than those with lower volatility.

Hypothesis 3 (null and alternative) addresses the third purpose of this study.
It attempts to ascertain whether stock portfolios with higher volatility produced higher
rates of return than those with lower volatility.
The CAPM implies that in a well-diversified portfolio, portfolio returns relate
to systematic risk only. The market compensates only systematic risk (P). With an
exactly true CAPM, unsystematic risk will make a zero contribution to portfolio
returns. The relationship between return and risk based on the CAPM is not always
consistent with the CAPM's prediction. Miller and Scholes (1972) found an apparent
association between high unsystematic risk and higher realized returns.

ji
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Testing this hypothesis will measure the validity of the compensation for P risk
implied by the CAPM. Second, this hypothesis will indicate the relative investment
behavior aggressiveness or conservatism of institutional portfolio managers.
Rejection of Hypothesis 3 will lead to the conclusion that institutional investors
manifested their superior ability by selecting stocks with a higher volatility, and
requiring a higher return. It could suggest that institutional investors considered the
volatility factor as a useful tool in forecasting risk of securities, and that volatility
played an important role in stock pricing.
Hypothesis 4 (Related to Firm Size Effect)
H04:

Stock portfolios composed of small firms' stocks do not exhibit greater
risk-adjusted rates of return than those composed of large firms' stocks,
ceteris paribus.

H,4:

Stock portfolios composed of small firms' stocks exhibit greater riskadjusted rates of return than those composed of large firms' stocks,
ceteris paribus.

Hypothesis 4 addresses die fourth purpose of this study, determining the
correlation between stock portfolios composed of small-firm stocks and risk-adjusted
abnormal rates of return.
This phase of the study will test whether institutional investments in stocks of
small firms earned abnormal returns. Earlier empirical studies had found that small
firms yielded higher average returns than large firms of equal risk. In other words,
average rates of return and firm size are related inversely and linearly. This study will
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use total asset as the measure of firm size. Tests of these hypotheses will include an
exploration of the January firm size effect.
Failure to reject Null Hypothesis 4 will lead to the conclusion that institutional
investors benefitted by cautiously including small firm stocks in their portfolios. This
will imply a measure of the small-firm effect in institutional investment.
Hypothesis 5-A (Related to R&D Expenditures)
Ho5a: Firms' R&D expenditures and institutional stock ownership percentages
do not correlate.
Ha5a: Firms' R&D expenditures and institutional stock ownership percentages
have a positive correlation.
Hypothesis S-B (Related to R&D Expenditures)
HoSb: Stock portfolios with higher R&D expenditures and higher
concentrations of institutional investors do not exhibit greater riskadjusted rates of return than those with less R&D expenditures and
lower concentrations of institutional investors, ceteris paribus.
Ht5b: Stock portfolios with higher R&D expenditures and higher
concentrations of institutional investors exhibit greater risk-adjusted
rates of return than those with less R&D expenditures and lower
concentrations of institutional investors, ceteris paribus.
Hypotheses S-a and 5-b address the final purpose of this study, determining the
correlation between firms' R&D spending and increasing institutional stock holdings.
This study will test whether the different levels of institutional shareholdings
are related to a firm's R&D expenditure.

There are two possible reasons that

institutional investors choose those firms with higher R&D. First, firms with higher
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R&D had greater returns; or institutional investors influenced managerial decisions that
increased firm value.
Failure to reject both null Hypotheses 5-A and 5-B would lead to the conclusion
that institutional investors had a long-term innovation-oriented motivation, rather than
a short-term-profit-oriented one. The acceptance of both null hypotheses would
preclude a definitive conclusion, and it would necessitate other experiments to explain
the different relationship. Failure to reject Hypothesis 5-A, coupled with rejection of
Hypothesis 5-B, would indicate that institutional investors had strong incentives to
monitor firm activities and continuously influence managers so as to increase firm
values.
Institutional Portfolio Performance Joint Effect Test
Finally, this study will test the effect of those five variables, as a whole, on the
portfolio performance. This is done to develop a decision model for institutional
investors' extra return in order to discover if there is a significant relationship between
portfolio returns and the five variables used in this study. The dependent variable is
the monthly mean return, based on the institutional ownership information.

The

indepen-dent variables are these explanatory variables: institutional ownership, beta,
volatility, total assets, and R&D expenditures.
If the multiple regression model is statistically significant, it gives rise to a
decision model for institutional investors' portfolio selection. With joint tests, it is also
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possible to see which variables are positively or negatively related to institutional
portfolio return.
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CHAPTER 5
SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY
Introduction
Ownership and control of U.S. corporations has increasingly shifted from
individuals to various intermediary institutional investors acting on behalf of their
constituents. Pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, and commercial banks,
have assumed an important role among these growing intermediaries.
Increased levels o f corporate stock holdings by these intermediaries have created
the opportunity for research on the behavior of institutional investor portfolio managers.
Much previous research has focused on mutual fund portfolio performances in terms of
managers’ timing and selection abilities. However, that research has not determined what
constituted those superior selection and timing abilities. This research has attempted to
ascertain whether institutional investment portfolio managers possessed a superior stock
selection ability.
Based on selection ability, this research evaluates performance attributes of
institutional portfolio managers. The role of the five following attributes related to
institutional investors are investigated. These are the small stock firm, January, beta,
volatility, and R&D expenditures effects. An investment strategy based on any or all of
66
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these attributes are related to portfolio rates of return. This chapter describes the sample
selection criteria and the methodology employed in testing the various hypotheses.
The Study Group
The study group is selected from firms listed on the Compact Disclosure
database35 during the 1989-1996 period.36 The Compact Disclosure monthly database
included all securities registered with the SEC and traded in American stock markets,
such as the NYSE, the AMEX, NASDAQ, and other regional stock markets. The
database included financial statement information, ownership characteristics, trading
histories, monthly average stock prices, and current dividend information for
approximately 9,000 publicly traded firms.37 Only those firms traded in the NASDAQ
national market system have sufficient information about the number of stocks owned by
institutional investors to warrant inclusion in the study group. Stocks traded on the other
regional markets in the non-national market system generally do not have sufficient data
fora meaningful analysis.

35The Compact Disclosure database contains corporate information on public companies filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
36 However, the sample excluded January 1989 and February 1990. Therefore, the study used 94
sets of monthly returns.
17The number of firms varied each year due to new listings and delistings of firms. The available
numbers of firms ranged from 4,000 to 6000 every year 1989 through 1996.
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Methodology
This section describes statistical methodologies designed to test the research
hypotheses, assumptions, and verifications required for each model. The main model for
testing the research hypotheses, Jobson and Koride's statistics, is used for significance
tests o f portfolio performance based on the traditional Sharpe measure. The traditional
CAPM and the market model had suffered problems because beta measurement required
an ex ante expected return generating model. Usually the estimate is prepared with data
from prior to the test period (Jobson and Korkie, 1981).
Sharpe's measure (1966) represented the excess return per unit o f risk, usually
represented by the standard deviation, for the market in a well-diversified portfolio.
Sharpe stated his original measure as
SH=^

(5-1)

where
Pi

represented risk premium, actual portfolio fs average holding period return
minus average risk-free rate over the same period.

O;

represented the standard deviation of portfolio i.

This Sharpe measure yields an excess return per unit of risk, but it is not used for
However, the study employed the Jobson and Korkie Z-statistic score facilitated testing
portfolio performance utilizing the Sharpe measure. This Z-statistic made it possible to
test statistical significance for excess returns comparing one portfolio's performance to
another. This method avoided the beta measurement problem.
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If risk premiums38 followed a multivariate normal distribution,39 they would
produce the following transformed difference for the Sharpe measure.40

(5-2)
where
SHm

=

transformed Sharpe performance measured difference between
portfolios i and m for overall period t, where i represented a
sample portfolio and m denoted the market proxy portfolio;

r i t ' r «t = Port^°^° (f or m) average means return premiums for overall
period t\
a^ =

standard deviation of portfolio i return premiums for overall period t;
and

MRisk premium represented actual return minus risk free rate.
39A violation of this assumption may lead to some differences between the actual distribution and
the sampling distribution of test statistics. This in turn causes misspecifrcation that may result in biased
statistical tests and misleading inferences. Skewness, Kurtosis and Shapiro’s Wilk (W statistic) tests of
normality reinforce the notion that return premiums are distributed in a fashion close to multivariate normal
(Elfakhani, 93).
40 Jobson and Korkie's transformed difference for the Sharpe measure is made possible by
generating asymptotic approximations to the distributions and the moments of die performance estimators.
They applied Taylor series expansion to get the asymptotic approximations for the expectation and variance
of an estimator. Taylor series approximations, to the first order term (0(1IT)), of the expectations of the
transformed differences gjp E(SHm)*(omv.-apj*(\
Thus, the bias to foe first order of die transformed
Sharpe difference is
However, this bias becomes small if the sample is large. If T is greater than
36, foe bias becomes almost zero (Jobson and Korkie, 1981).
The asymptotic distributions of die Sharpe performance measures are obtained by observing that
they are estimators which are functions of the element of r and S, where returns are assumed multivariate
normal. Under these conditions foe asymptotic distributions may be derived as

i* "7
2o?
where foe variances are equivalent to foe 0(1/7) Taylor series approximations, to the true variances of the
sampling distributions. For greater detail see Jobson and Korkie (1981).
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aAC —

standard deviations of portfolio m return premiums for overall period
t.

A statistical significance test could have resulted from calculating the following
Z-score:

ZSHm~

(5-3)
V

where
0 represented variance of Sharpe measure, with the variance calculated as
follows:

T

2ofo2 -2o o o +—pfo2 +—u2 o2 i

m

i m im

2

2

20

(a2 +a2a2

O '

1 m

where
represented covariance between mean return premiums of portfolios i and
m for the study period.
T

represented number of observations.

For any pair o f portfolios, the appropriate test required determining whether the
difference in the transformed Sharpe measures, SHla^c equaled zero. Jobson and
Korkie's transformed difference for the Sharpe measure served to compare a portfolio's
performance in some time period relative to another period or to compare different
portfolios in the same period. Jobson and Korkie's Z-score made it possible to compare
portfolios and determine whether one differed from the other. A Z-score of less than a
table value (for example, 1.96 for .025 significance level for two-tailed test) precluded
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rejection of the null hypothesis. Elfakhani (1993) employed this methodology to test
Canadian stock returns.
Jensen's alpha measure (1968, 1969) served as a second method in this study.
This model used pooled time series and cross sectional data. Equation 2-5 tested for a
positive alpha, resulting from an institution’s superior selection ability. Jensen's alpha
measure performed two functions: confirming the result of Jobson and Korkie's Z-score
and determining the magnitude of Jensen's Alpha as a superior stock selector for
professional portfolio managers.

V

V

V

P / (Jf« ' V

+iv

(5 -4 )

where Rm represents equally weighted index of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ markets.
The other variables are defined in Chapter 2.
Finally, the multiple regression tested the joint effect of the five factors (firm size,
beta, volatility, R&D, and level of institutional ownership) on portfolio returns of
institutional investors. The results yielded a prediction model for stock anomalies in the
context o f institutional stock ownership.

A »M m pti9P»

1. Transaction costs: this study evaluated portfolio performance using the monthly
percentage total portfolio return on a gross return basis; it measured returns before
any deductions for transaction costs, fees, taxes, or operating expenses. This does not
mean that all institutional trades in the securities market had no transaction costs.
Institutional investors had different transaction costs or fees. This test utilized
portfolios formed by several criteria and ignored transaction costs and other fees to
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assure comparability among institutions. The reader can use the findings to estimate
the effects o f varying levels of cost on the reported results.
2. Monthly gross return: this test used monthly stock returns as in the following return
equation:
ru = (Pu

+ dJ/Pu-i

(5-5)

where
ru

-

mean return of security i during time t,

p/ f

=

average monthly stock price of security i during time t,

Pu-i

~

average monthly stock price of security / during time
period t-1, and

&it

=

dividend for security i paid during time period t.Al

All these monthly gross returns data came from the Compact Disclosure monthly
database.
3. Ownership, asset, and R&D expenditures data: All data for ownership, assets, and
R&D expenditures came from the October Compact Disclosure database in each year
1989-1996.
4. The risk-free rate surrogate is the one-month returns: U.S. Government Treasury
Bills with approximately 30 days left to maturity came from The Wall Street Journal.
This one-month risk-free rate proxy applied to both sample portfolio returns and
market index returns.
5. Equally weighted average rate of return: Equally weighted index for each calendar
year of all New York and, American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ stocks are used
to proxy market index returns.

41 However, this study excluded the dividend portion. The stock with sticker TDK in Compact
Disclosure had dividend payments of $21 for January through May, 1991 and $25 for June through
December for the same ye*-. Although this firm paid only twice for the year, the Compact Disclosure
database contained die previous dividend payment information for every month under the current dividend
section; Compact Disclosure carried the most recent dividend payment information all the way until a new
dividend payment occurred. This information, if included, would have created false information on gross
stock returns.
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6. The study did not use the month’s data for stocks with a price of less than $5 at any
month end, in order to avoid returns with little economic significance. This applied
to both the sample portfolio and the market index portfolio.42
7. The study did not use data for stocks with a monthly return greater than 100%. While
some stocks may legitimately rise spectacularly within one month, these outliers
might cloud the significance of the great majority o f institutional investing. This
exclusion of stocks rising 100% or more in a month applied to both the sample
portfolio and the market index portfolio.
8. Construction of market index portfolio (control groups). The control groups are
utilized only for Jobson and Korkie's test. The control groups use the following
three criteria.
Ownership portfolio. The control group for the ownership portfolio is a market
index portfolio consisting of all common stocks traded on the New York Exchange,
American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ. This control group is used because the
subject of interest is how institutional investors perform compared to the market.
Beta, volatility, small firm portfolios. The same classification rules for these
variables are applied for forming both the control groups and the sample groups. The
classification criteria are explained in detail under each section of those variables.
R&D portfolio. The R&D sample portfolio is formed using a two-step procedure as
mentioned in Chapter 2. First, all sample firms are divided into three groups based
upon the percentage of institutional ownership. Then, each of those three groups is
subdivided into three groups based upon the amount of R&D expenditures. On the
other hand, the control group for the R&D portfolio consists of the universe of stocks

42This procedure eliminated annually approximately 1,100 stocks from die total sample, resulting
in changing the mean share price from SI8.93 per stock to $23,476. Only 380 stocks are removed from
the NYSE or AMEX with this price restriction; most stocks removed were NASDAQ stocks.
Before Price Restriction

After Price Restriction

sample size

mean stock
price

sample size

mean stock
price

NYSE and
AMEX only

2,180

S24.68

1,800

S29.36

1

| All Markets

4,800

$18.93

3,700

$23.48

|
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divided into low, medium, and high levels of R&D expenditure, without having first
been divided based on any other criterion.
Hypothesis I; Institutions’ Superior

Selection AbilltyJwt
Research Hypothesis 1 examined whether institutions possessed a superior stock
selection ability. Professional portfolio managers may have had better information than
individual investors. They also employed economies of scale with pooled assets.
Therefore, as the concentration of institutional ownership increased, the portfolio return
from increased institutional ownership also may have increased. The first hypothesis
anticipated greater portfolio returns from higher levels of institutional ownership than for
the market or lower levels of institutional ownership.
The statistical model for Hypothesis 1 examined data through Jobson and Korkie's
transformed Sharpe measure and Jensen's alpha measure. First, the Sharpe measure is
calculated. Second, the transformed differences for the Sharpe measure are calculated
and tested for statistical significance by measuring Z-scores. The risk premiums for
sample returns is regressed on the market risk premium multiplied by the portfolio beta
to find any positive alphas. A significant positive value from the regression would have
indicated that institutional portfolio managers possessed a superior selection ability.
This procedure required a division of institutional ownership into five categories.
The application of quinine percentages resulted in the formation of five stock portfolios
based upon what percentage of the company all institutions collectively own, is as
follows:
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•
1st ownership portfolio: less than 20% of each company is owned by all
institutions taken collectively.
•
2nd ownership portfolio: more than 20% but less than 40% of each company is
owned by all institutions taken collectively.
•
3rd ownership portfolio: more than 40% but less than 60% of each company is
owned by all institutions taken collectively.
•
4th ownership portfolio: more than 60% but less than 80% o f each company is
owned by all institutions taken collectively.
•
5th ownership portfolio: more than 80% of each company is owned by
institutions.
Models 5-1 and 5-3, respectively, measured Sharpe and Jobson and Korkie's Z-score.
Next, portfolios with different institutional ownership are compared to the market
index portfolio in terms of portfolio return through Sharpe and transformed Sharpe
measures. Jensen's alpha is used measure to confirm the results. Consistency between
the data and the CAPM indicated that the researcher could not distinguish subsequent
time series from zero (equation 5-4). The mean risk-adjusted excess returns for all
portfolios should have equaled zero under the null hypothesis. On the other hand, a non
zero value of alpha would have attributed market anomalies to some variables. With
portfolios grouped on the basis of ownership percentage, any systematic departures from
zero would indicate an ownership-level effect.
Portfolio betas(Pp), which represent systematic risk of the portfolio, are simply an
average o f the individual security betas, weighted by the proportion of each security in
the portfolio as in following equation:
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3p =i =£i * 33
where z, =

3

C5-6)

the proportion of portfolio market value represented by security j,

N=

the number of securities, and

Pj =

beta o f security j.

The time series OLS regression is constructed with one-month T-Bill rates; monthly
portfolio returns are calculated by equation 5-5; and portfolio betas are estimated by
equation 5-6. Equation 5-4 measured Jensen's alpha.
Hypothesis 2: Beta Attribute Test
Tests of Hypothesis 1 determine if different levels of institutional ownership
consistently experienced any significantly superior performance in picking undervalued
stocks.

Hypotheses 2 through 5 determine superior performance attributes of

institutional investors who consistently performed in a significantly superior manner
Assuming rejection of null Hypothesis 1, tests of Hypothesis 2 determine whether
institutional investors exploited higher-beta stocks. McDonald (1974) found that highbeta funds generally outperformed low-beta funds with reference to market-based
portfolios of equal systematic risk. Hypothesis 2 compares the significance of mean
monthly excess returns for higher-beta portfolios with that of the market portfolio.
Estimates of systematic risk, pi( are developed for each of about 8,000 firms operating
over the entire 1989-1996 period. It did so by regressing stocks' monthly returns
against market monthly returns:
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where cq and Pi represent regression intercept and slope statistics, respectively;
and Ti t represents the regression model’s unexplained residual return in period
t.
The study group for Hypothesis 2 included only stocks owned partly or
exclusively by institutional investors. The model utilized the following beta categories
for forming test portfolios. This division has been made to equally divide the sample:
1st beta portfolio; less than .50,
2nd beta portfolio; > .50 and £ 1.0,
3rd beta portfolio; > 1.0 and £ 1.5,
4th beta portfolio; > 1.5 and £ 2.0, and
5th beta portfolio; greater than 2.0.
Each of those portfolios is compared with different values of beta to market index
portfolio in terms of portfolio return through Sharpe and the transformed Sharpe
measures.
Jensen's alpha measure serves to confirm the results of the Sharpe measures.
A 5% significance level (one tail test) for the comparison between any of the sample
portfolios and the market index portfolio would reject the null hypothesis. This would
suggest that high-beta funds outperformed low-beta funds for market based-portfolios
of equal systematic risk. Jensen's alpha distance, also, significantly differs from zero.
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Hypothesis 3: Volatility Attribute Test
Hypothesis 3 (assumed rejection of null Hypothesis 1) examines whether
institutional investors exploited the stock volatility. The variance measured total risk
over the 96 months for an individual security or portfolio.
Badrinath et al. (1989) found institutional ownership inversely related to stock
volatility. CAPM also suggested that the market did not compensate for unsystematic
risk. It inferred that institutional investors required relatively higher returns for holding
high risk stocks. Hypothesis 3 sought to determine how much higher compensation
institutional investors required for holding higher volatility stocks in their portfolio.
The study group for Hypothesis 3 included only stocks owned partly or
exclusively by institutional investors; it established the following standard deviation
categories for forming test portfolios. The classification has been made to equally
divide the sample size:
1st volatility portfolio; less than .10,
2nd volatility portfolio; > .10 and £ .13,
3rd volatility portfolio; > .13 and £ .16,
4th volatility portfolio; > .16 and £ .20, and
3th volatility portfolio; greater than .20.
Each portfolio with different volatility values is compared to the market index
portfolio in terms of returns through Sharpe and the transformed Sharpe measures.
Jensen's alpha measure confirms the result of Jobson and Korkie's statistic. Jensen's
alpha indicated whether monthly excess returns increased or decreased as volatility
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changed. Any statistically significant relationship between monthly excess returns and
levels o f volatility would have indicated volatility exploitation by institutions.
Hypothesis 4; Small Finn Effect Test
Tests of Hypothesis 4 investigated whether institutional investors made use of
the well-known small firm effect in their investment portfolios. Assuming the rejection
of null Hypothesis 1, institutional investors' superior selection power might result from
purchasing small stocks. Previous research has indicated that small stocks usually
provided higher returns. Badrinath et al. (1989) found that institutional investors prefer
larger, more liquid firms; however, they did not study whether those larger firms
actually generated greater returns in the context of institutional ownership. Small firms
have had more difficulties than larger firms in generating needed funds. Therefore,
they have needed to pay higher incentives for potential fund providers. Hypothesis 4
addressed these theories. It anticipated that as the size of assets increases, the riskadjusted excess returns measured by monthly stock returns would decrease.
Many previous studies found that the month of January has a unusual price
behavior (Ritter, 1988). It is of interest to investigate January separately from other
months. To address this issue for this study, it expands the equation (2-5 or 5-4)
described in Chapter 2, by introducing dummy variables for January and non-January
months. Following is the basic model:

i
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(5_8)

where Model 5-8 is just a modification of Equation (2-5) with a dummy variable, which
takes the value of one in the month of January and zero otherwise. The other variables
are defined as in Equation (2-5).
In testing for the small firm effect, stocks owned partly or exclusively by
institutional investors are divided into the following five categories:
1st asset portfolio; less than $40,000,
2nd asset portfolio; > $40,000 and £ $120,000,
3rd asset portfolio; > $120,000 and £ $340,000,
4th asset portfolio; > $ 340,000 and £ $1,460,000, and
5th asset portfolio; greater than $1,460,000.43
The division gave an approximately equal sample to each category. Five
portfolios formed the basis for testing small firms' high return attribute in institutional
portfolio performance. Sharpe and the transformed Sharpe measures are used to compare
different portfolio returns to the market index portfolio. Then they applied Jensen's alpha
measure to confirm the result of Jobson and Korkie's statistic. Jensen's alpha made it
possible to test whether monthly excess returns increased or decreased as asset amounts
changed. A negative association between asset amounts and excess returns would have
shown that institutional investors preferred small firms.

43 Thousand dollars omitted.
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Hypothesis S; RAD Expenditures and

Institution!! Ownership Rtlitigmhip
Test
Tests of Hypothesis 5 examine how institutional ownership relates to R&D
expenditures and how higher R&D expenditures relate to monthly stock portfolios
returns. These tests could have produced a negative, positive, or no correlation at all
between R&D expenditures and the levels of institutional ownership.
The following regression model tested the first relationship:
R&Dlt = a, + b, (Ownit) + eit

(5-9)

where R&D, the dependent variable, represented the natural log of total R&D
expenditures for firm i during time /; Own, the independent variable, represented the
actual percentage of institutional ownership for firm i during time t; and eit represented
error term. Equation 5-9 used ANOVA to estimate the relationship between a dependent
measure of R&D expenditure and an independent measure of institutional ownership
percentage. Badrinath et al. (1989) found that larger firms, on average, had higher levels
of institutional ownership. Larger firms, on average, also have higher levels of R&D
expenditures. These facts led to an expectation of a positive relationship between
institutional ownership and R&D expenditures. However, this would not necessarily
indicate a positive relationship between portfolio excess returns and higher R&D for firms
with higher institutional ownership.
In testing the second part o f Hypothesis 5, firms are ranked by percentage of
institutional holdings as of October o f each year and placed in one of three groups. Group
1 contained stocks with the smallest percentage of ownership by institutions, while groups
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2 and 3 contained an approximately equal number o f firms with equally increasing
percentages of institutional ownership.
First, the study groups for R&D expenditures are divided according to the
following ownership criteria:
1st ownership group; less than 30%,
2nd ownership group; > 30 % and £ 60%, and
3rd ownership group; greater than 60%.
Second, each ownership group is rearranged from high to low R&D expenditures
to form another three equal-sized data sets. Then, it divided each subset portfolio into
three portfolios by amounts o f R&D expenditures, using the following criteria:
1st R&D category; less than $10,000,
2nd R&D category; > $10,000 and *$100,000,
and 3rd R&D category; greater than $100,000.44
This resulted in 9 portfolio groups. Each of those portfolios (with different level
of ownership and different amount of R&D expenditures) are compared to the market
index portfolio in terms of portfolio return through Sharpe and the transformed Sharpe
measures. Jensen's alpha measure is used to confirm the result of Jobson and Korkie's
statistic. Jensen's alpha made it possible to see how monthly excess returns related to the
various institutional ownership and R&D expenditure levels. It was anticipated that
results might have explained the interests or orientations o f institutional investors. Did

44All units are thousand dollars omitted.
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they act as myopic investors, or as hyperopic investors? Did they act in a manner
hyperopic because higher R&D spends generated greater excess returns, or because higher
R&D expenditures had income production potential?
Institutional Portfolio Performance
Joint Effect Tests
Finally, the sign of the relationship between institutional portfolio performance
and five explanatory variables (institutional ownership, beta, volatility, firm size and
R&D expenditures) is estimated. This is in order to determine whether an institution’s
portfolio choices based on one or more of those five variables might affect its future
performance. The following multiple regression equation analyzed the cross-sectional
predictability of institutional portfolios:
R j = b 0 + biO W N j + bjBETAj

+ bjVOLf + b 4FSj -I- bsRAD j +

(5-10)

where
Rj

= Mean return of stock j in the institutional portfolio for the entire study
period. In this case, R/ is just gross stock return, but not a excess return.

b„

= Intercept term.

b, through b5= Parameters for OWN, BETA, VOL, FS, and R&D, respectively.
OWNj - Mean percentage o f institutional ownership for stock j for the entire

study period.
BETA,-

= Beta of stockj in the institutional portfolio for the entire study period.

VOL,- = Return volatility o f stock j in the institutional portfolio for the entire
study period.
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FSi

= Mean value of assets of companyj in the institutional portfolio for the
entire study period.

R&Dj

= Mean value of coincident (not lagged) R&D expenditures o f company
j in the institutional portfolio for die entire study period.

e,-

= Error term for stockj during the entire study period, distributed as N(0,
o2).

* FS and R&D are represented by natural log.
An observation consisted of a stock that had all information for the dependent and
five independent variables. Institutional ownership, firm size, and R&D expenditures for
each firm are annual, changing during each of the eight years of the study period. Annual
data for firm assets and total R&D expenditures changed each year during the eight years
of the study period, but did not change monthly within each year. Firm assets tend to
change only slowly, and R&D expenditures may bear a lagged relationship to sales. Beta
was based on monthly return data, computed by applying the market model to the entire
study period (not to a preceding estimation period). Stock-price variability was based on
the entire set of observations used in computing beta.
This procedure resulted in approximately 8,000 observations for each of the
variables except R&D expenditures. Because not all firms reported R&D expenditures,
the actual sample size was reduced to approximately 2,300 observations.
This procedure automatically removed firms without institutional investors, so the
sample, taken as a whole, may be said to represent a collective institutional portfolio.
In a multiple regression model, when two or more independent variables are
highly correlated with each other, the model is said to have a problem with

i
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multicollinearity. Volatility and beta are expected to be correlated with each other in this
empirical test. The amount of R&D expenditures and the total assets are also expected
to be positively related to each other. Therefore, these two pairs are expected to exhibit
multicollinearity. The existence of multicollinearity tends to inflate the variances of
predicted values, that is, predictions of the response variables for sets of x values,
especially when these values are not in the sample. Moreover, muticollinearity tends to
inflate the variances o f the parameter estimates.
To detect the multicollinearity, a correlation matrix45, the VTF statistics (variance
inflation factors), and condition number (or index) were applied in this test. The variance
inflation factors are useful in determining which variables may be involved in the
multicollinearities. There are no formal rules for deciding the magnitude of variance
inflation factors that cause poorly estimated coefficients. According to the SAS System
fo r Regression (1996), values exceeding 10 may indicate multicollinearity, but this is
arbitrary.
The other method, the condition number, is the square root of the ratio of the
largest to smallest eigenvalue, which provides a single statistic for indicating the severity
of multicollinearity. As in the VIF statistics, criteria for a condition number to signify
serious multicollinearity are arbitrary, with the value 30 often given (SAS System for
Regression 1996).

45A high correlation coefficient of 70 or 80 over indicates that there is correlation between the two
independent variables, causing multicollinearity.
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CHAPTER 6
RESULTS
Introduction
Chapters 2 and 3 presented a review of literature relevant to this study, and
Chapter 4 stated the five hypotheses. Chapter 5 described the data and the statistical
methodology. This chapter presents the empirical test results for all five hypotheses and
the joint effect of five variables (ownership level, beta, volatility, firm size, and R&D
expenditures) on portfolio performance.
The first section of this chapter presents and analyzes Hypothesis 1 results; those
tests determine whether institutional investors possessed a superior selection ability. The
second section presents and analyzes results for Hypothesis 2 through Hypothesis 5;
which dealt with attributes o f portfolio performance. The third section presents and
discusses the multiple regression analysis results for the joint effects of five variables on
institutional portfolio performance.
Hypothesis 1; Institutions* Superior
Selection Ability Test
Hypothesis 1 examines whether institutional investors exhibited superior stock
selection power. Tables 1-1, 2-1A, 2-1B, and 4-1 summarize the results of ownership

86
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analysis. Table 1-1, which reports the results of Model 5-1, indicates that some
ownership portfolios exhibited greater Sharpe measures than the market portfolio.
Middle-range ownership portfolios had Sharpe measures below those of the market,
whereas both lower and higher ownership portfolios exceeded the market average.
Monthly mean risk-adjusted excess returns (actual return minus the risk free rate)44
gradually increased as the level of ownership increased. At the same time, portfolio risk,
represented by the standard deviation for ownership portfolio returns, also rose as the
concentration of ownership increased. There is an association between higher risk
premium and greater risk-taking. The highest Sharpe measure-80% or more-coincided
with the highest ownership quinine. The next highest Sharpe measure coincided with the
lowest quinine.
The Sharpe measure of the ownership portfolio as a whole was not significantly
different from that of the market index portfolio. This implies that the performance of
institutional investors, taken as a whole, matched the performance of the overall market.
Thus, collectively, institutional investors would have earned their management fees, but
no more, in a market without transaction costs. Given that the market has transaction
costs, institutional investors collectively failed to match the market.

Obviously,

performance of particular institutional investors differed from that o f the average
institutional investor.

46In the context of die CAPM, excess return refers to the actual return of a stock over its expected
equilibrium return (see the positive intercepts in Models 2-5 or 5-4). In this case the term “excess return”
represented a mean return in excess of the monthly risk-free rate.
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Table 2-1A reports the results of Jobson and Korkie's test in Model 5-2. Jobson
and Korkie's transformed difference test for the Sharpe measures provided a statistical
decision criterion. That criterion applied to performance differences between Sharpe
measures for ownership portfolios and the Sharpe measure for the market index portfolio.
Only one ownership portfolio—the fifth quinine, representing between 80% and 99%
ownership—showed mean risk-adjusted excess returns that differ from the market index
portfolio, at die 5% level. However, for the first and second ownership portfolios, the
positive transformed Sharpe measures, shown under column SHimin Table 2-1A, showed
no statistical significance. Sharpe measures for the first and second sample portfolios did
not differ significantly from the market average. According to the Z-score on Table 2-1A,
institutional investors with the highest ownership percentages earned a significantly
positive risk-adjusted excess return. That return exceeds the market portfolio average.
Table 2-1A indicates that risk adjusted return produced negative Jobson and
Korkie's Z-scores for the third and fourth portfolios; the market portfolio outperformed
these portfolios. Institutional investors' selection ability did not exist at lower and middle
ownership levels. Indications of stock selection ability occurred only among higher level
institutional ownership portfolios.47 However, table 2-1A reports that the overall
performance of institutional investors does not exceed the market index. Ownership
portfolio analysis implies that although a significant mean excess return difference
between ownership and market portfolio is found at one certain level of ownership

47However, this finding might have differed if the study had employed several different control

groups to compare sample output, instead of only one.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

!

89

portfolio, institutional investors as a whole could not outperform the market index returns.
The same result has been found in the Jensen's alpha test reported below.
Table 2-1B reports the results of the tests for significant differences between pairs
of ownership portfolios. Table 2-1B indicates statistically significant performance
differences at the 0.025 level between the fifth and fourth quintiles and also between the
fifth and third quintiles. Stocks held in greater percentage of institutional investors’
portfolios exhibited higher risk-adjusted rates o f return, which confirmed expectations
of this study.
Table 4-1 summarizes the results of Jensen's alpha measure regressed by Model
5-4, which led to the same conclusion as the Jobson and Korkie's Z-statistic. Like
traditional Sharpe measures, Jensen's alpha measures required pre-computed portfolio
betas and showed positive intercepts for the first, second, and fifth ownership portfolios.
Those betas resulted from weighting the beta averages of the underlying securities, as in
Model 5-6.
Table 3-1 indicates that portfolio betas increased as ownership concentration
increased. The first quinine (below 20%) had a Jensen’s alpha value of .055%, the second
quinine (between 20% and 40%) had a value of .022%, and the third quinine (between
40% and 60%) had a value of -.028%. The fourth quinine (between 60% and 80%) had
a value of -.01%, and the fifth quinine (more than 80%) had a value of .46%. As in
Jobson and Korkie's analysis, the highest Jensen's alpha measure came from the fifth
ownership portfolio. However, Jensen's alphas for the remaining ownership portfolios

J
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indicated no mean return differences between the sample ownership portfolio and the
market average portfolio at the 5% level of significance.48
The highest ownership portfolio (consisting o f stocks with greater than 80%
institutional ownership) provided the highest mean risk-adjusted excess return. The
lowest ownership level, consisting o f companies whose stocks were less than 20% owned
by institutions, created the next largest excess return. Jensen’s alphas led to the same
conclusion as the Sharpe measures. The two largest alphas, .46% and .055%, come from
the fifth and first quintile categories, respectively. The remaining quinine portfolios
produced insignificant results in this Jensen's alpha test
The overall performance by institutional investors does not exceed the market
mean index. The intercept term for the overall model in the table 4-1, while nominally
positive, does not achieve statistical significance. This result is the same as in the Jobson
and Korkie's test
The results of the tests of Hypothesis 1 suggest that as ownership levels increased,
risk premium, portfolio betas, and portfolio risk also increased. Mean excess returns of
the sample and control groups did not differ significantly, except in the last ownership
portfolio, because of the association between higher returns and higher risks. This implies
that institutional investors did not always succeed in purchasing stocks that could bring
higher returns. As the "safety-net" theory would imply, continual scrutiny of institutional
portfolio managers' performance and investment choices tended to insure intrinsically

4S The T statistic had a value of 2.026, and probability had a value o f .0457 for the highest
ownership portfolio (between 80% and 99% ownership portfolio).
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sound, well-informed, and prudent investment decisions.

Institutional investors

concentrated their activity on sound and stable stocks rather than on stocks with higher
rates of return.
The highest ownership portfolio showed the greatest risk-adjusted excess return.
This ownership category also had the greatest portfolio risk and portfolio beta for its
actual returns; the reward for the higher risk far exceeded the increasing risk. The results
of Jobson and Korkie's transformed Sharpe difference and Z-score supported this
relationship.
These results and analyses supported rejection of null Hypothesis I, leading to the
interpretation that monthly mean risk-adjusted excess returns of stock ownership
portfolios correlated positively with institutional investors' ownership concentration. At
the highest level of ownership portfolio, the study found a significant difference between
sample portfolio excess returns and the market index portfolio return.
However, overall, there is no evidence that institutional investors, on average,
outperform investors who purchase index funds. This implies that the market is very
efficient. However, as reported in earlier studies, a small number of portfolios can
consistently achieve a superior stock selection. There are also significant return
differences between a low institutional ownership group and a high institutional
ownership group. This means that, for the sample period, stock portfolios held in greater
percentage by institutional investors exhibit higher risk-adjusted rates of return. This
study concludes that not all the institutional markets are perfectly efficient. This study
found that institutional investors earned consistently higher return than that of the market
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index portfolio when they hold stocks mostly owned by themselves and other institutional
investors. Perhaps these stocks are obvious “winners” and investors continue to bid up
prices.
Hypothesis 2: Beta Attribute Test
Tests of Hypothesis 1 found that portfolios held mostly by institutional owners
exhibited superior returns, inferring superior stock picking ability. Based on those results,
Hypotheses 2 through 5 addressed the identification of institutional investor attributes
which led to that superior selection ability. Hypotheses 2, the first step in identifying
those attributes, examined whether institutional investors benefitted from portfolios of
different betas. Each sample beta portfolio and each control group beta portfolio were
compared. Models 5-1, 5-2, and 5-4 tested the beta effect on institutional portfolio
performance. Tables 1-2,2-2A, 2-2B, and 4-2 summarize the results of the beta analysis.
Table 1-2 reports results of Sharpe measures.
As reported in Table 1-2, the Sharpe measure for the low-beta portfolio was lower
in the institutional ownership portfolio than in the control portfolio; equal in the second
portfolio to that of the control portfolio; and higher in the remaining three portfolios than
in the control groups. As the value of beta increased, so did the risk premiums and
portfolio standard deviations. The increasing rate of return in the sample beta portfolio
return did not outpace the increasing rate of return in the control group as the value of
beta increased. As Table 1-2 indicates, the highest beta portfolio (stock portfolios
consisting of betas greater than 2.0) had a slightly higher mean risk-adjusted rate of return
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than that of the counterpart in the control groups. Conversely, the lowest beta portfolio
had a lower return than that of the counterpart in the control groups.
Table 2-2A reports the result of Jobson and Korkie's test. This table reports
differences of monthly mean risk-adjusted excess returns between sample beta and market
index portfolios. According to Table 2-2A, only the third level (between 1.0 and 1.5) beta
portfolio had a performance that differed from the market index portfolio at the .05 level.
The tests determined whether a portfolio of large beta stocks outperformed a portfolio of
small beta stocks, and it compared both with market index portfolios.
Table 2-2A indicates that—except for the third level beta portfolio—Jobson and
Korkie’s Z-test did not support higher Sharpe measures for the higher beta categories.
As the value of beta increased, the monthly mean risk-adjusted excess return also rose;
however, those increases did not outpace the risk increase. Tests of Jobson and Korkie's
statistic implied that compensation for beta risk almost equaled the CAPM market risk
premium. Performances measured by monthly mean risk-adjusted excess returns at both
lower and higher levels of beta portfolios did not significantly differ from that of the
market index portfolio. Only in the middle range beta portfolio did the performance
surpass the market index performance. Table 2-2B shows no significant differential
performance between any two portfolios.
Table 4-2 reports Jensen's alpha measures in Model 5-4, which also support the
Jobson and Korkie's Z-test result. The initial step in calculating Jensen's alpha is the
calculation of portfolio betas by Model 5-6. Table 3-2 reports that as the value of beta
increased, portfolio betas also increased. Jensen's alphas, which indicated superior

I
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performance, turned negative at the middle level of beta stock portfolios,49 but positive
at both higher levels and lower levels of beta stock portfolios. However, there are no
significant alphas. This implies that institutional investors used a stock portfolio selection
process which can be reasonably approximated by CAPM, and which approximated the
market performance before taking costs into account. The relationship between the
portfolio betas and their respective monthly mean excess return is tested by the marketbased portfolio50OLS regression.
MR = .001849 + .005311 beta + ut
(.0003)
(.0001)

R2 = .0325'
n = 8,396

* Numbers in parentheses represent t-value significance level.
where MR represented monthly mean excess return for the market-based portfolio.
Figure 1 depicts these relationships.

49However, this is completely opposite to the Jobson and Korkie’s test Maybe this is due to the
different market index applications between the Jobson and Korkie’s test and Jensen’s test
30This regression was made by regressing a stock’s excess return on its beta in the market index

portfolio.
Sl This very small R-square represented a cross-sectional time-pooled regression. The F statistic
had a value of 83 and probability had a value of .0001.
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Figure 1. SYSTEMATIC RISKS AND EXCESS RETURNS52

52Dots in the graph represent die combinations o f die following beta portfolio excess returns and
their respective portfolio beta of the beta portfolio.________________________________________
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P portfolio 5
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1.7
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1.2
* PER represents portfolio monthly mean excess returns.
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The study found no substantial dispersion of monthly mean excess returns of beta
portfolios from that of the market-based portfolio.
The attribute test implied that higher betas did not contribute significantly to
superior institutional investor selection. The Sharpe measures indicated no significant
transformed difference between sample and control groups. This finding contradicted
McDonald's (1974) theory. As CAPM would imply, the systematic risk and monthly
mean risk-adjusted excess return are positively related. Higher and lower betas received
the compensation stated by CAPM, so other selection criteria, filters, or screens which
may have been applied by portfolio managers do not appear to have added to institutional
portfolio returns. Although middle range beta groups showed significance with Jobson
and Korkie’s test only, they had very small Sharpe and Jensen measures.
All beta attributes tests, including the graph explaining the relationship between
systematic risk and excess return, resulted in failure to reject null Hypothesis 2. In fact,
the performance of the medium size (third) beta portfolio outperformed the market index
portfolio. On the other hand, the overall beta test results coincided with the CAPM
prediction. Thre is a positive relationship between systematic risk and monthly excess
return based upon Jensen's measure. However, this hardly suggested that the beta effect
made a major contribution to the institutional investors' superior stock selection ability.
It implied only that the higher beta group did not outperform the counterpart of the market
index in the control groups. Finally, if beta had an effect on institutional portfolio
performance, that effect might have come from the middle range of beta categories.
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Hypottofr 3;VQlitility Attribute
Teat
As the second step in identifying elements o f institutional investors’ extra
selection ability, tests of Hypothesis 3 examined whether institutional investors
considered total variability (represented by standard deviation) of individual stocks. The
tests compared each o f the volatility portfolios to its counterpart in the market index
portfolios.
Tables 1-3,2-3A, 2-3B, and 4-3 summarize the results of the volatility analysis.
Table 1-3 reports results of Sharpe measures. As this table indicates, risk premium,
portfolio standard deviation, and Sharpe measures in the sample groups increased as the
value of the standard deviation grew larger. At the same time, risk premium, portfolio
risk, and Sharpe measures in the control groups rose as the level of volatility increased.
According to this table, all except the first of the volatility categories had higher Sharpe
measures than those o f market index portfolios.
Table 2-3A presents the result of Jobson and Korkie's Z-test. The table data
indicate that mean excess returns from the volatility portfolios did not differ from those
of market index portfolio, and that this result holds true. Institutional investors required
higher compensation for holding riskier securities in their portfolio. However, those
riskier stocks did not provide institutional portfolio managers with extra returns; they only
compensated for their risks compared to their counterparts in the market index portfolios.
Table 2-3B reports differential performances between portfolios within the
volatility groups. According to this table, higher volatility groups produced greater
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performance, thus supporting Hypothesis 3. This contradicted the traditional expectation
of CAPM that the market would reward only systematic risk. Volatility could not have
contributed to institutional investors' extra selection ability because their paired
comparison with those of market proxy returns did not differ.
The Jensen's alpha results measure, shown in Table 4-3, did not confirm the
results of Jobson and Korkie's test. Rather, they indicated that at lower and middle ranges
of volatility, portfolios performances did not consistently provide significant differences
from that of the market index portfolio. Neither the negative Model 5-4 intercept terms
for the first and second volatility portfolios nor the positive terms for the third portfolio
in Table 4-3 was significant However, the positive intercepts and their /-values appeared
significant at the 0.16 significance level for the fourth volatility portfolio and at the .01
significance level for the fifth volatility portfolio. The different output of Jensen's
measure related to Jobson and Korkie's Z-score resulted from a different market index
application.*3 When compared to the market index portfolio, stocks with higher levels of
volatility apparently helped institutional investors generate extra portfolio returns.
Volatility tests gave mixed results, leading to interpretations. According to the
Jobson and Korkie's test, volatility did not significantly contribute toward extra portfolio
returns. However, Jensen's measure gave contradictory results, because institutional

53 This study created five different market indices that had the sample categorization rules as
applied to the sample categorization. Jensen's measure had just one market index return, which came from
the characteristic of CAPM. CAPM had a market rate of return as one of its components. However, based
upon the assumption that the market index had been divided into five categories as in the sample, the actual
results have ended up with die same as the Jobson and Korkie's results. At all levels, the test of volatility
did not appear to significantly contribute to institutional investors' portfolio extra return.
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investors with higher levels of portfolio volatility generated extra returns. The different
results imply that when compared to the market, the volatility portfolio generates excess
returns, hi the control groups, the volatility portfolio does not generate excess returns.54
Null Hypothesis 3 is rejected, but results are mixed on whether high portfolio
volatility caused additional portfolio returns. Contrary to the CAPM expectation, the
market provides investors with higher returns that compensated for higher risk. Investors
required higher rewards for holding riskier stocks. However, riskier stocks produced
higher returns than the market portfolios. The portfolio volatility analysis results of
Hypothesis 3 depended upon the methodology chosen for the test. At lower volatility
levels, both methodologies indicated there was no contribution of volatility to institutional
investors’ superior selection ability. Jobson and Korkie’s test implied that higher
volatility could not contribute to institutional investors’ superior stock selection ability.
However, the Jensen’s alpha measure result is opposite that of the Josbson and Korkie
test; volatility is found to contribute to institutional investors’ extra returns.
Hypothesis 4; Firm Size Effect Test
As the third step in searching for components of institutional investors’ extra
selection ability, Hypothesis 4 tests whether institutional investors sought any small firm
effect. Tables 1-4,2-4A, 2-4B, and 4-4 summarize the results of this.

54 This means that the return o f the stock market as a whole is less than that o f the segmented
market index (as in the control groups) for Jobson and Korkie’s test.
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First, Table 1-4 reports the results of Sharpe measures in Model 5-1. All Sharpe
measures in the sample groups outperformed the market index portfolios. The first and
the second paired groups showed the two biggest Sharpe measure differences. This
analysis indicates a negative relationship between asset portfolio risk and firm size.
Monthly mean excess returns are also related negatively to firm size. As in earlier
studies, firm size (represented by total assets) is related inversely to portfolio returns.
Over the entire study period, the portfolio with the highest asset value earned the lowest
Sharpe measure (.0881); the group with the lowest asset value earned the highest, .265.
Of the five variables tested, size revealed the smallest portfolio risk difference
(1.496%) between firms in the lowest category (3.518%) and firms in the highest category
(5.014%), while Sharpe measures produced the greatest difference (.1774) between firms
in the lowest category (.088) and those in the highest (.2654). This implies that
institutional investors, by having small firm stocks with relatively smaller risk in their
portfolios, might have increased their portfolio extra returns.
The fifth asset group ($1.46 billion assets and more) showed the lowest Sharpe
measure, .088. This implied that although larger firms had high trading liquidity, they
hardly contributed to institutional investors' investment maximization goal.
Table 2-4A reports the results of Jobson and Korkie's Z-test in Models 5-2 and
5-3. It indicates that the smallest firm group showed a significantly high Jobson and
Korkie's transformed difference measure of .93, with 2.05 Z-score.55 The Z-statistic

35The second asset portfolio had the next largest transformed measure of .54, with 1.82 Z-score.
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indicated consistent statistical significance at the .02 level for the transformed Sharpe
difference in mean risk-adjusted return between the smallest sample asset group and the
counterpart in the control group. This transformed difference decreased as firm size
increased (see values under column SHimin Table 2-1A). Table 2-4B also indicates that
a group of smaller firms (e.g., portfolio 1) performed better than a group of larger firms
(e.g., portfolio 2, 3, 4, and 5). This inverse relationship between firm size and return
confirmed the results of the Sharpe measure.
Table 4-4 reports the Jensen's test which confirmed the results of Jobson and
Korkie's test The alpha measure for the smallest group (.62%) represented the intercept
in Model 5-4. This alpha denoted the vertical distance between a portfolio's actual return
and its "equilibrium" level of expected return suggested by the CAPM. This positive
distance implied an undervaluation of some of the securities in the small asset portfolio.
Institutional investors may have increased portfolio extra returns by including as many
of those stocks as they could in constructing their investment portfolios.
The third and fourth larger asset portfolios did not have alpha measures as high
as the first or the second portfolios. This implied that larger firms, in general, gave
nothing but liquidity to institutional investors.
January Test: Table 5-1 reports the results ofModel 5-8. The January regression
intercepts were not statistically significant, nor were they significantly different from the
index fund. The results indicated no relationship between Jensen's alpha and firm size in
the small firm-January effect test. These results were not consistent with previous
hypothesis testing, but caution should be exercised when interpreting the results. This
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study covered only an eight-year period of monthly return data. Previous studies—such
as Jaffe, Keim, and Westerfield (1989)—utilized much longer time periods. Eight
observations per portfolio might not have produced a sufficient basis for the January spot
test.56
Hypothesis 4 implied that institutional investors considered small firm effects in
their portfolio construction. As in earlier studies, firm size related inversely to
institutional portfolio returns, which gave institutional portfolio managers a chance to
create extra returns. The results dictated rejection of null Hypothesis 4.
Hypothesis S; Test of Relationship
Between RAD Expenditures and
Iflgtiltttional-Qwiimliip
As the last step of analysis of extra institutional portfolio returns, Hypothesis 5
measured relationships between levels of institutional ownership and R&D expenditures.
Those tests used F-statistic and p-values to examine the relationship between R&D
expenditures and institutional ownership. Tests of Hypothesis S-B then determines
whether that relationship contributed to institutional investors’ superior stock selection
ability.

16 Inappropriate data application for this test may have precluded detection o f a significant

January effect hi previous studies, more than half of the excess January returns occurred during the first
five trading days of that month (Roll, 1983). However, this study used stock price information contained
in the Compact Disclosure database, which contained monthly average stock prices.
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Tests of Hypothesis 5-A
Table 6 presents F-values, R-squares, significance levels, coefficient estimates,
and p-values of the Model 5-9 regression. Table 6 gives the value of the F statistic
(F=3596) and the probability value (.0001). The results indicate a positive relationship
at the .01 significance level between R&D expenditures and each level of institutional
ownership.57
The t-statistic (t=60) of the independent variable (institutional ownership
percentage) also confirmed a linear relationship between the natural logarithm o f R&D
expenditures and institutional ownership percentages at the .01 significance level.
Ownership proved significant with a .042214 coefficient. Firms with higher levels of
institutional ownership exhibited higher R&D expenditures. The results aligned with
previous studies such as Kochhar and David (1996) and Hansen and Hill (1991).
With respect to R&D expenditures, institutional investors behaved in a hyperopic
manner. These findings dictated rejection of null Hypothesis 5-A.
Test of Hypothesis 5-B
Hypothesis 5-A proved a significant positive relationship between institutional
stock ownership levels and R&D expenditures. Hypothesis 5-B examined whether that
relationship contributed to institutional investors' superior stock selection ability. Tables

57When added with firms' total assets to Model 5-9, R-square increased to 63% from 27%, while
the overall significance level remained as low as the .0001 in the original model. Morever, more
importantly, contrary to Demsetz and Lehn (1985), institutional ownership is positively related to firm size
measured by total assets. The t-statistic of the asset variable is significant at the .0001 level. This finding
is consistent with the Badrinath et al. argument For more details, see Table 6-2.
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1-5, 2-5A, 2-5B and 4-5 summarize R&D expenditure contributions to institutional
portfolio performances.
Table 1-5 presents results of Sharpe measures through Model 5-1. As the size of
R&D expenditures increased, Sharpe measures at all ownership levels decreased, in
contrast to expectations. Regardless of the level of institutional ownership, smaller R&D
portfolios outperformed larger R&D portfolios. The R&D portfolios with higher
institutional ownership outperformed the same levels of R&D portfolios with lower
institutional ownership. The LM portfolio (L for low institutional ownership, M for
medium R&D expenditures) foiled to equal the market portfolio’s performance; all other
R&D portfolios performed better than the control groups.
Table 2-5 reports the results of Jobson and Korkie's transformed differences and
Z-scores for R&D portfolios in Model 5-2 and 5-3. The table indicates that none of the
nine R&D portfolios showed any different performance at the 5% significance level,
compared to the matched sample of similar market index portfolios. However, R&D
portfolios in the highest ownership group dominated other R&D portfolio groups in the
different ownership groups. The lowest R&D portfolio with the highest ownership group
showed the biggest transformed Sharpe measure (1.36). However, higher significance test
results did not support that high transformed difference because of the increased level of
portfolio risk. In general, the contribution of the R&D factor to institutional portfolio
performance related inversely to amounts of R&D spending and positively to levels of
institutional ownership. The results of Jobson and Korkie's test supported the results of
the traditional Sharpe measure.
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Table 4-5 represents the results of Jensen’s alpha measures in Model 5-4. All the
intercepts for the largest R&D expenditures in the Jensen's alpha test proved negative, but
are not significant Among them the largest R&D portfolio with the highest institutional
ownership portfolio produced the greatest intercepts. Within the same institutional
ownership group, R&D expenditures related inversely to the Jensen's alpha measure. This
meant that higher level of R&D expenditures did not contribute to institutional investors'
selection ability. This precluded rejection of null Hypothesis 5-B.
Institutional investors exhibited great concern with research and development
costs; however, those expenditures did not have a positive correlation with portfolio
performance.58 In theory, bigger firms had higher levels o f institutional ownership59
(Mason, 1995) and a strong positive correlation with R&D expenditures.60 This study
found an inverse correlation between firm size and stock returns; however, higher levels
of ownership positively related to stock returns.
These results could lead to several conclusions. First, excess returns from higher
institutional ownership did not overcome the inferior returns from larger firms. Second,

51The impact of R&D on firms’ profit usually occurs with a lag, not coincidentally. This study
tested die relationship between the amount of R&D expenditure and its effect on the firms’ profit, assum ing
coincidence. An assumption of coincidence implies that investors and firm managers can all arrive at an
expected present value of the results of R&D. If this is not the case, a new model might be needed to lag
the effects of R&D, thereby alleviating the problem of when to expect to receive benefits from the
expenditure.
39However, this is contrary to Demsetz and Lehn’s (1985) argument
60Regression tests between firm size and R&D expenditures created an R2 of 66%, with a .0001
significance level. For more details, see Appendix Table 6-3.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

r
106

institutional investors prefer firms with relatively higher R&D expenditure, despite the
possible diminution of current return, because of the potential long-run benefits.
Institutional Portfolio Performance
Joint Effect Test
Finally, this study develops a forecasting model for institutional portfolio
performance, based on all variables employed in this test. Table 7 reports the results of
model 5-10. Limited multicollinearity problems occurred with all the independent
variables.61 For example, output Table 7-1 lists a rather low (.06) regression R2. Since
l/O-R^l.Oti,® variables associated with VTF values exceeding 1.06 related more closely
to the other independent variables than to the dependent variable.
The Condition Number is used for detecting multicollinearity is the square roots
of the ratios o f the largest eigenvalue to each of the other eigenvalues. The number of
large values in this column also indicates near linear variable dependencies.
Multicollinearity problems may exist when eigenvalues have condition numbers greater
than 30.63 In output Table 7-2, all eigenvalues had condition numbers less than 3.5.

61 Statistical literature and prior research have established no formal criteria for determining the
magnitude of variance inflation factors that cause poorly estimated coefficients. Usually, values exceeding
10 have caused concern, but page 97 of the 1996 SAS Regression Manual treats this value as arbitrary.
However, “for models with low coefficients of determination for the regression, estimates of coefficients
that exhibit relatively small variance inflation factors may still be unstable---- ” (SAS Regression Manual
1996,97).
62 The variance inflation factor equaled l^l-R j2), where Rj2 represented the coefficient of
determination for the “regression” of the ith independent variable on all other independent variables.
63 This is also arbitrary, not a formal criterion.
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The correlation matrix in Table 7-1 also indicates some multicollinearities
between R&D and assets between volatility and beta, and between R&D and institutional
ownership. However, removing one of those variables which caused multicollinearity
problems at a time, produced no significant changes in the variances or values of the
parameter estimates. The interpretation of regression output in model 5-10 assumes
some multicollinearity.
Model 5-10 was significant at 0.01, with small (5.9%) variability. The F value
was 28.7. See Table 7-2.
R, = -.03637 + .0002 Own + .002 BETA + .0675 VOL + .004 FS - .0025 R&D
(.0001) (.0001)
(.0006)
(.0001)
(.0001) (.0001)
* The numbers in parentheses represent the significance level of t-statistics.
In Table 7-2, all explanatory variables are significantly related to institutional
portfolio performance. Beta is significant at the .0006 level. The signs of coefficients for
each of the variables are positive, except for that of R&D.
All the signs except that for the asset variable are as hypothesized. The asset
variable related negatively to the portfolio return in the attribute test. Holding constant
all other variables, the model indicates an increase of .0002 in monthly mean portfolio
return with each percentage increase in institutional ownership; and the model predicts
an increase of .004*(l/$33,000,000) in monthly mean portfolio return for each unit of
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increase in assets.64 This finding disagreed with results of the small firm attribute test.
Holding constant everything else, with one unit increase in R&D expenditures, the model
predicts a decrease of .00253*(1/$132,000) in monthly mean portfolio return.65
The final chapter presents the overall conclusions from testing and analysis. More
detailed implications, limitations, and suggestions for future research are presented.

64 In a semi-linear-log form of regression, the slope of this form depends upon the value of
independent value of asset, the value of dependent value of portfolio return, or both. As a non-constant,
it depends upon where along the function the expression is evaluated. In this case, the portfolio has a mean
average asset value of $33,000,000. If this mean value of assets were to change, then the slope of this
expression might change, too. Therefore, this slope has validity only with a mean value asset of
$33,000,000.
<5 Mean value of R&D expenditures. The same theory applies to the R&D variable as asset

variable.
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study examines the recent dramatic increases of institutional holdings of
corporate stock. It also measures the success of portfolio managers’ returns on
investment. Did these managers possess a superior stock selection ability? If they did,
where did the stock selection power come from? Did it come from beta, stock volatility,
small firm effect, R&D expenditures, or some combination of these? If they possessed
a real superior stock selection ability, could a description of that ability form a prediction
model for future investors?
This study utilized data for stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ.
It tested five potential explanatory hypotheses using Sharpe’s measure, Jobson and
Korkie's Z-test, and Jensen's alpha measure. For Sharpe’s and Jobson and Korkie's tests,
several different market index portfolios were constructed by the same classification rules
as those applied to sample groups. For Jensen's model, a modified CAPM model was
employed.

109
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Institutional Ownership
Analysis of ownership portfolios indicated that institutional investors are
somewhat successful in choosing undervalued stocks. Institutional investors as a whole
do not show superior selection ability performance when compared to a market index
portfolio. However, when the ownership portfolios are divided into groups based on
different levels of ownership concentration, some of these exhibited a significant
difference in mean excess returns, relative to the market. Stocks with more than 80% or
less than 40% institutional ownership produced the highest extra returns. The selection
power of institutional investors proved very weak at the middle range of institutional
ownership. This implied behavior is consistent with the safety net theory. Portfolio
managers selected solid, safe, and prudent stocks, with secondary emphasis on returns.
Gross returns analysis excluded transaction costs. Had these costs been included,
the mean return differences between the ownership and market index groups might have
equaled, or even fallen below, that of the stock market as a whole.
The monthly mean return for companies owned by institutions did not
significantly exceed returns for the market except for the portfolio in which stocks
represented companies at least 80% owned by institutions. Although stock portfolios
owned significantly by institutions showed a relatively high portfolio risk, the return
outpaced the risk-to-retum ratio. Risk-adjusted rates of return of highly condensed
ownership portfolios outperformed lower ownership concentration portfolios.
Although the institutional ownership sample as a whole showed neither
significantly superior nor inferior performance, individual portfolios performed in a
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superior maimer. This is consistent with results of mutual fund studies such as McDonald
(1974), Mains (1977), and Kon and Jen (1979). This finding is consistent to the
“sophisticated” clientele group (Gruber, 1996) in which money is directed to funds based
on performance.

Beta Effect
The second hypothesis addressed the beta effect on institutional portfolio
performance. Portfolio excess returns are examined within several different beta portfolio
levels. Jensen's alpha measures computed by the modified CAPM (Model 5-4) showed
that the intercept did not significantly differ from zero and did not support the traditional
high beta performance theory.

Although middle range beta portfolios generally

outperformed the market, the higher beta effect did not contribute to institutional
investors’s superior portfolio performance. In this case, sample portfolio compensation
equaled its systematic risk.
Volatility Effect
Volatility analysis presented mixed results, depending upon the methodology
applied; and at higher levels of volatility, Jobson and Korkie's test implied that
institutions generated no abnormal return from stock volatility. To the contrary, Jensen's
alpha measure indicated that institutions benefitted from stock volatility, which might
provide useful information for institutions seeking to generate extra portfolio returns.
Contrary to the traditional view on volatility, the markets compensated for total risk. As

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

I

112

volatility increased, the rate of return also increased commensurately with the market
index, as shown in Table 1-3.
Firm Size and January Effect
The small firm effect resulted in the greatest contribution to institutions' superior
selection power. In general, the smaller firms generated higher monthly mean excess
risk-adjusted rates of return.
The expected January effect was not funded. However, the data used for testing
the January effect may not have properly served this purpose. Previous studies showed
that the January effect occurred in the first few trading days of the year, but this study
employed monthly return data.
R&D Expenditures
The test of R&D expenditures using simple and multiple regression indicated a
positive, but weak relationship between R&D expenditures and both institutional holdings
and institutions’ abnormal returns. In the context of R&D expenditures, institutional
investors acted hyperopically.
The next test investigated whether the positive relationship between R&D
expenditures and institutional ownership contributed to portfolio performance. In general,
the level of R&D expenditures and monthly mean excess risk-adjusted rate of returns
were inversely related. R&D expenditures portfolios with higher institutional ownership
showed greater rates of return.

Although the results did not prove significant, the
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relationship occurred across institutional ownership levels and with all test
methodologies.
Institutions were found to prefer firms with larger R&D expenditures, but these
did not generate extra returns. Institutional managers may have preferred larger R&D
expenditures because o f a high correlation between R&D and innovation.
Joint Effects Test
This study presents a limited decision model based upon several explanatory
variables. The multiple regression model produced significant results at the .01 level with
an F statistic of 28.7. The output of Model 5-10 indicates a significant relationship
between portfolio returns and four variables (volatility, beta, asset, and institutional
ownership).
Contrary to expectations, the R&D variable related inversely to the portfolio
return. This supported the results of the of R&D expenditures attribute test. The asset
variable contributes positively to institutional portfolio returns. This is contrary to the
results of the total assets attribute test. Each of the parameters was significant, and the
regression model explained 5.9% of the total variation.
Contributions
This study evaluated the portfolio selectionability performance of institutional
investors. Most previous work focused on only one segment (mutual funds) which does
not represent the performance of all institutional investors.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

114

Additionally, this study determined some characteristics of institutional investors
by examining relationships between their stock selection ability and their attributes.
Previously, most academic work on institutional investors focused on identifying superior
time forecasters and superior stock selectors. The previous literature lacked behavioral
facts such as the “whys and hows” of superior investment selection. Institutional
performance is related to firm quality attributes such as beta, volatility, firm size, and
R&D expenditures.
In conclusion, institutional investors as a whole are not superior stock selectors;
however, specific portfolios performed in a superior manner. The institutions’ superior
selection ability is partly based on such firm quality attributes as firm size and returns
volatility effects.
Limitations
One of the limitations of this study is that it used monthly return data that did not
completely satisfy the purpose of the research. The test of the January small firm effect
was likely not significant due to the use of monthly return data.
Directions for Future Research
This study tested the effects of selected variables—beta, stock volatility, firm size
effect, R&D expenditures—on financial institutions’ stock portfolio returns. Other proven
anomalies such as cash flow, E/P ratio, past performance, liquidity ratio, book to market
ratio, working capital, and earnings might also have affect institutional portfolio returns.
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To develop a more accurate relationship between superior institutional
performance and its attributes, a research study design should include institutional micro
and macro forecasting such as timing of beta manipulation. Furthermore, a future study,
based on individual institutional investors rather than upon investors as a whole, would
give insight for evaluating institutional investment behavior. Future research should
incorporate both cross-sectional and time-series data.
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BETA-RETURN RELATIONSHIP
AUTHOR. JOURNAL

SAMPLE. PERIOD

ISSUES & RESULTS

Black, Jensen, and Scholes,
1972
Studies on the Theoiy of
Capital Markets

Monthly returns of NYSE stocks,
1931-1965

Low-risk stocks had higher returns than the CAPM
would predict. High-risk stocks had lower returns
than the model would predict.

NYSE common stocks monthly
returns, 1935-1968

A positive and linear relationship between return and
risk, but very weak statistical evidence.

McDonald, 1974
JFQA

123 American Mutual Funds
Monthly Returns, 1960-69

High-beta funds "outperformed" low-beta funds and
the neutral performance of mutual funds.

Fama and French, 1992
J of Finance

NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ return
files from the CRSP, 1941-90 &
1963-90

A relation between average stock returns and beta
during the longer period, but no relation over the
shorter period.

Chan and Lakonishok, 1993, J
| of Portfolio Management

Monthly returns files from CRSP,
1926-1991

A strong positive relation between beta and risk up to
1982, but no relation thereafter because of noise in
the data.

1 Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan,
I 1995
fl J of Finance

Monthly portfolio returns of NYSE
No relation between beta and average return over the
and AMEX stocks from CRSP, 1927- relatively shorter period; however, a positive relation
90,1940 -1990, and 1963-90
between average returns and beta risk over the longer
period, provided that the study measured betas at the
annual interval.

Fama and MacBeth, 1973
| J of Political Science
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RISK-INSTITUTIONAL HOLDINGS RELATIONSHIP
——
Sias, 1996
Financial Analysts Journal

— M-

-

-

...

SAMPLE. PERIOD

ISSUES A RESULTS

Weekly rate of returns for all
securities listed on NYSE from
1977 to 1991

Focused on the relationship between volatility and institutional
holdings. An increase in institutional holdings increased volatility;
the increase preceded an increase in volatility because institutional
investors played a destabilizing role in financial markets. However,
higher returns resulted in relatively lower volatility.

U

FIRM SIZE AND BETA-RETURN RELATIONSHIP

| Lakonishok and Shapiro, 1986 All stocks traded on the NYSE for
J of Banking and Finance
at least 8 years between 1954 and
1981 and CRSP monthly return
data from the period 1962 -1981

Studied the historical relationship between stock market returns and
the following variables: beta, residual standard deviation, and size.
Neither the traditional measure of beta risk nor the alternative risk
measures could explain the cross-sectional variation in returns;
only size appeared to matter.

| Ritter and Chopra, 1989
HJ of Finance

They found a positive risk-retum relation in January for small firms
but not for large firms. High-beta small firms had higher excess
returns than low-beta small firms in January, irrespective of
whether the market provided a positive or negative return.

The CRSP monthly returns file of
NYSE securities for the 19351986 period

00
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FIRM SIZE EFFEC
SAMPLE. PERIOD
Banz, 1981
J of Financial Economics

Monthly return data from CRSP files of
all stocks traded in the NYSE during
1926 to 1975 period

Small NYSE firms have had significantly larger risk
adjusted returns than large NYSE firms over a fortyyear period. He found a non-linear relation; the
smallest earned larger excess returns, whereas the
medium size portfolios showed little difference from
that of the largest. The study found a size effect, but
no clear explanation.

Roll, 1981
J of Finance

Several different interval returns of
NYSE and AMEX from 1962 to 1977

An improper estimation of security betas could have
explained part of the observed risk-adjusted excess
returns related to size. Previous studies had
improperly measured the riskiness of small firms.

Reinganum, 1981
J of Financial Economics

366 NYSE and AMEX stocks from
1976 to 1977 based on quarterly and
annual earnings data

Small firms systematically experienced average rates
of return significantly greater than those of large firms
with equivalent beta risk. This suggested either a
misspecified CAPM or inefficient capital markets.

Reinganum, 1983
J of Financial Economics

Daily return data of CRSP files from all
securities traded on the NYSE and
AMEX from 1962 to 1980

To test for size effects. Small firms experienced large
returns during the first few trading days of January.

Brown, Kleidon, and Marsh, 1983
J of Financial Economics

Quarterly data of 366 firms listed on the The study found a linear size effect. It also found a
NYSE (1926 -1978) and AMEX (1963 - sensitivity to the time period studied and
1978)
methodologies applied.

-

1
I

1
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FIRM SIZE EFFECT (continued)
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Keim, 1983
J of Financial Economics

CRSP daily stock files from 1963 to
1979 based on stocks listed on the
NYSE and AMEX

A negative relation between size and average returns.
Large means for January relative to the remaining
eleven months.

Reinganum and Smith, 1983
J of industrial Economics

CRSP daily files during the period from
1962 to 1978 from all securities traded
on the NYSE and AMEX

Small firms experienced substantially higher average
returns than large firms on a risk-adjusted basis.

Barry and Brown, 1984
J of Financial Economics

Monthly NYSE security returns for the
period 1926 to 1980.

To find the cause of firm size effect with differential
information. Factors other than differential
information influenced the firm size effect.

Lakonishok and Shapiro, 1986
J of Banking and Finance

Monthly return data from the CRSP
files and covering the period from 1954
to 1981

Small firms yielded higher returns than did larger
firms; however, with January data, the size variable
lost its statistical significance.

Jaffe, Keim and Westerfleld, 1989
J of Finance

Monthly return data of AMEX and
NYSE firms from the CRSP files during
the period, 1951-1986

A significant size effect in January.

Ritter and Chopra, 1989
J of Finance

The CRSP monthly returns file of NYSE About the risk-retum characteristics of small firms in
securities for the period 1935-1986
January. The study found a positive risk-retum
relationship in January for small firms but not for
large firms. High-beta small firms had higher excess
returns than low-beta small firms in January,
irrespective of positive or negative market returns.
. . . . . . . .
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.
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FIRM SIZE EFFECT (continued)
SAMPLE. PERIOD

Amihud and Mendelson, 1989
J of Finance

CRSP monthly return data of NYSE
securities for the period 1960-1979

Tested whether asset returns served as an increasing 1
function of their beta risk, residual risk, and firm size. 1
Conclusion: a positive beta, but negative residual risk 1
and firm size relationship with asset returns.

Tsetsekos and DeFusco, 1990
J of portfolio Management

CRSP data files and Value Line for the
1979-1984 period

To test whether portfolios of firms with high
managerial ownership outperformed portfolios of
firms with low managerial ownership. They found the
size effect, but it did not depend on the level of
managerial ownership.

Leong and Zaima, 1991
J of Business Finance & Accounting

CRSP files for NYSE-AMEX returns
and National OTC Stock Journal from
1981 to 1983

Focused on OTC stocks to find the clue for the small
firm effect because OTC stocks had lower values than
those of NYSE-AMEX. All together, no small firm
effect; however, the January excess return for OTC
stocks exceeded that of the smallest market value
NYSE-AMEX group.

Elfakhani, 1993
Review of Financial Economics

300 firms of Toronto Stock Exchange
for the sampling period 1977 to 1988
based on quarterly and annual data

Small and medium sized firms displayed superior
performance over large firms during most of the study
period.
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BETA NON-STATIONARITY

Fabozzi and Francis, 1978,
JFQA

Monthly Returns of NYSE stocks from
CRSP files, 1965-71, random coefficient
model.

True beta moved randomly, while the OLS beta 1
performed as a point estimate which did not
R
vary over the sample period.
Q

Roenfeldt, Griepentrog,and Pflaum,
1978, JFQA

Monthly 664 firms from the Compustat
Price-Div.-Eamings Tape, 1963-74

Betas had a definite tendency to remain in the
same quintile over time.

Kon and Jen, 1979
J of Business

49 mutual funds, monthly return from 1960
to 1971
Quandt’s switching regression model applied.

A mixture of two (21funds) or three(6funds)
regression equations rather than that of the
standard linear model. It tested for timing
activities.

Fabozzi and Francis, 1979, J of
Finance

Monthly rates of return for 85 mutual funds
from 1965-71 single index market model

No indication of shifting mutual fund
systematic risk for Bull and Bear markets.

Sunder, 1980
J of Finance

Monthly rates of return for NYSE stocks
from 1926-75

The market risk followed a random walk over
time, and it followed an autoregressive process.
The average level of nonstationarity varied from
one subperiod to another (high during 1926-50
and low during 1963-75).

Merton, 1981
J of Business

Simulations

Superior market-timing ability earned a
substantial additional average rate of return.

Henriksson and Merton, 1981, J of
Business

Statistical techniques for testing timing
forecasting ability through both parametric
and nonparametric

Tested for timing ability. Nonparametric:
Forecasting skills differed for up markets and
for down markets. Parametric: the expected
"up-market" beta of the portfolio exceeded the
expected "down-market" beta of the portfolio.
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BETA NON-STATIONARITY (continued)
SAMPLE. PERIOD. A M ETHODS

ISSUES & RESULTS

I

Ohlson and Rosenberg, 1982, J of
Business

NYSE common stocks from 1926 -1975,
equal-weighted market portfolio preferred.

A tendency for betas to converge rather slowly I
toward a norm (the stationary mean) and a
j
stationary first-order autoregressive process.
1

Lee and Chen, 1982
J of Economics and Business

Monthly rates of return for 363 NYSE
companies from 1965 - 1979

65% of the sample firms showed an unstable
beta over the ten-year period.

Kon, 1983
J of Business

Monthly rates of return for 37 mutual funds
from 1960-1976

Individual mutual funds exhibited significant
positive timing ability; however, portfolio betas
remained stable over the study period.

Chang and Lewellen, 1984
J of Business

Monthly rate of returns for 67 mutual funds
from 1971-1979

No evidence of skillful market timing or clever
security selection abilities', mutual funds did not
outperform a passive investment strategy.

Henriksson, 1984
J of Business

116 open-end mutual funds using the
parametric and nonparametric techniques
from 1968 -1980.

Indicated little evidence of ability by portfolio
managers to successfully engage in either
market timing or selectivity during this period.

Bos and Newbold, 1984
J of Business

Monthly return data of464 stocks from
NYSE, 1970 -1979

Strong evidence for randomness of systematic
risk in the market model rather than
autocorrelation.

Simonds, LaMotte, and McWhorter,
Jr., 1986
JFQA

100 firms from NYSE during 1951-1974

Betas for individual NYSE-listed stocks
apparently nonstationary.

U>
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BETA NON-STATIONARITY (continued)
ISSUES A RESULTS
Breen, Jagannathan, and
Ofer, 1986
J of Business

Simulation techniques and monthly return
data on the stocks in the NYSE during the
period 1968 -1982, VW

The correction for heteroscedasticity
significantly improved the power of testing
market timing ability.

Collins, Ledolter, and Rayburn, 1987
J of Business

Weekly return data for both 500 individual
securities and 500 portfolios of size 10,50,
100 from NYSE and AMEX covering 196281

Proved a stochastic variation in the beta risk of
equity securities. Weekly data improved the
power of the test.

Rahman, Kryzanowski, and Sim, 1987 119 utilities firms during the period 1974
J of Financial Research
through 1978 and 1979 through 1983, VW

53 and 69 utility firms rejected at the 5% and
10% level of significance, respectively.

I
1
|
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R&D EXPENDITURE AND INSTITUTIONAL HOLDINGS
AUTHOR. JOURNAL

SAMPLE. PERIOD

ISSUES & RESULTS

Jarrell and Lehn, 1985
Securities and Exchange
Commission

324 companies (19 industries) for the
period 1980 to 1983.

To look at the relationship between
H
institutional ownership and R&D spending.
Q
Found a positive relationship between the level
of institutional ownership and the R&D-tosales ratio.

Graves, 1988
Academy of Management J

22 computer-manufacturing companies
only for the period from 1976 to 1985

A negative relationship between R&D
spending and institutional ownership; high
levels of institutional ownership may have
suppressed R&D spending of the computer
industry. However, the study measured R&D
expenditures per employee rather than the
R&D-to-sales ratio.

Hill and Snell, 1989
Academy of Management J

Firms in COMPUSTAT tapes for
1979-81

A positive relationship between major
stockholders and R&D expenditure per
employee.

Hansen and Hill, 1991
Strategic Management J

129 firms based in four research
intensive industries over the period
1977- 1986

Examined the relationship between R&D
spending and institutional ownership. Higher
levels of institutional ownership may have
coincided with greater R&D expenditures. It
defined R&D intensity as the percentage of
total R&D spending to sales rather than R&D
per employee.

1

to
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R&D EXPENDITURE AND INSTITUTIONAL HOLDINGS (continued)
AUTHOR. JOURNAL

SAMPLE. PERIOD

Bathala, Moon, and Rao, 1994
Financial Management

A sample firms from the NYSE,
A negative relationship among institutional
AMEX, OTC in existence at the end of ownership, the level of debt financing, and
1988
managerial equity holdings. An inverse
relationship between the debt ratio and R&D
expenses.

Kochhar and David, 1996
Strategic Management J

135 mainly manufacturing firms traded
on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ
for 1989 year end data

ISSUES & RESULTS

Examined the relationship between institutional
investors and firm innovation. The results
indicated that institutions did not foster a short
term orientation; instead, they may have
influenced firms to increase innovation.

to

ON
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MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE
AUTHOR. JOURNAL

SAMPLE. PERIOD

ISSUES & RESULTS

Jack Treynor
1965
Harvard Business Review

Performance of mutual, trust and
pension funds for the period 19541963

Developed a method for evaluating fund
1
performance. The slopes of characteristic lines 1
allowed for a relative evaluation of fund
1
managers’ performances. (T-R)lbm
1

Jack Treynor and
Kay Mazuy
1966
Harvard Business Review

Performance of 57 open-end mutual
funds during the period of 1963

Devised a statistical test to estimate fund
8
managers' timing abilities by introducing a
curved term, (rm-rr)2in the characteristic line.
Found little evidence of timing ability.

William Sharpe
1966
J of Business

Performance of 34 open-end mutual
funds, 1954-63

Devised an R/V ratio for portfolio rankings.
(Reward-to-variability ratio). Explained the
relationship between risk premium and standard
deviation. The Dow-Jones R/V had a .667 ratio;
however, the average fund in this sample had a
.633 R/V.

Michael Jensen
1968
J of Finance

The returns on the portfolios of 115
open-end mutual fUnds for the period
1955-64

Devised a way of evaluating the performance
portfolios in terms of funds managers' selection
abilities. The alpha-hat average, calculated net
of expenses (-.011), indicated that on average
the funds earned about 1.1% less per year than
they should have earned, given their level of
systematic risk.
|

I

to
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MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE (continued)
------- ------- =*—
■ «■■ ■
ISSUES & RESULTS

—i ■■

AUTHOR. JOURNAL

SAMPLE. PERIOD

John McDonald
1974
JFQA

Return of 123 American mutual funds
using monthly returns in the period
1960-1969

In a world of transaction costs and management
fees, he found a zero alpha, which meant
neutral performance.

Norman Mains
1977
J of Business

The same sample as Jensen's
empirical, which is 1IS mutual funds
for the period 19SS-64.

Based on monthly return data, mutual funds
performed in an approximately neutral manner
on a net return basis.

Kim, Tye
1978
JFQA

The quarterly investment performance
of mutual funds in the period 19691975.

No abnormal performance with the weighted
index portfolio applied.

Grinblatt and Titman
1989
J of Business

Monthly mutual fund data from Dec.
1974 to Dec. 1984

Some evidence of superior forecasting ability
on the part of the fund manager at the
individual level; however, overall mutual fund
actual returns, net of expenses, did not exhibit
abnormal performance.

_____________________

s>
Q
O
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TIMING AND SELECTION ABILITIES

I

AUTHOR. JOURNAL

SAMPLE. PERIOD

ISSUES & RESULTS

Kon and Jen
1979
J of Business

49 mutual funds from January 1960 to
December 1971.

Some superior performance in terms of overall |
selection ability; however, mutual fund
managers individually and on average could
not forecast the future prices well enough to
recover all fees.

Stanley Kon
1983
J of Business

Monthly data of 37 mutual funds from
Jan. 1960 to June 1976

Some success among individual fund
managers; however, fund managers as a group
had no special abnormal returns.

Henriksson
1984
J of Business

116 open-end mutual funds monthly
performance using the parametric and
nonparametric techniques from 1968
to 1980.

Both tests showed that mutual fund managers
could not forecast market movements. Only
three funds successfully timed the market.

Chang and Lewellen
1984
J of Business

67 mutual funds form Jan. 1971 to
Dec. 1979.

Found neither skillful market timing nor clever
security selection abilities.

Lee and Rahman
1990
J of Business

Monthly returns for 87 months
(January 1977 - march 1984) for a
sample of 93 mutual funds.

Some evidence of superior micro- and macro
forecasting ability on the part of the fund
manager at the individual fund level.

M
vO

f
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Table 1-1 Sharpe Measure (SM) for Institutional Ownership Portfolio
(Based on Model 5-1)
ow n.,
<20*

20* < o w n ,.z
s40*

40%<own,_,
s6 0 *

60% <own,.4
s80 *

ow n,.,
> 80%

own
ovenll

Market
index P.

Portfolio
Retum(%)

.943

1.004

.983

1.039

1.561

.989

.991

Riskless
Rate(%)

.399

.399

.399

.399

.399

.399

.399

Risk
Premium

.544

.605

.584

.64

1.162

.59

.592

ap(%)

3.537

3.887

4.123

4.492

5.112

3.814

3.894

SM

.162

.156

.142

.142

.227

.155

.152

N*

1,007

1,009

799

521

99

3440

3,678

1
|

*N represents average numbers of monthly sample size for the entire study period from
Jan. 1989 to Dec. 1996.
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Table 1-2 Sharpe Measure (SM) for Beta (p) Portfolio
Sample Beta Portfolios (Based on Model 5-1)_______________
P.-i<5

•5<Pi«i£l

I <P[_3J£1.5

l.5<P,.4s 2

P.-s> 2

Portfolio Return(%)

.573

.827

1.055

1.359

1.838

Riskless Rate(%)

.399

.399

.399

.399

.399

Risk Premium

.174

.428

.656

.96

1.439

<rp(%)

1.244

2.788

4.480

6.366

9.205

SM

.140

.154

.146

.151

.156

N

687

1,030

909

457

341

Market Indexes Portfolio for Beta (Control Groups)
.5 < P m-2s l
l< P m.js I.5
Pm-l^-5
1.5<Pm_<

Pm«J> 2

s2
Portfolio Return(%)

.614

.826

1.012

1.329

1.760

Riskless Rate(%)

.399

.399

.399

.399

.399

Risk Premium

.215

.427

.613

.93

1.361

o9{%)

1.222

2.771

4.464

6.338

9.373

SM

.176

.154

.137

.147

.145

N

725

1068

934

500

431
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Table 1-3 Sharpe Measure (SM) for Volatility (Oj) Portfolio
Sample Volatility Portfolios (Based on Model 5-1)_____________
.20
. 10c
. 13
.13<o,.3s.16 .16«r,.«s.20
O|_t < .I0
Portfolio Return(%)

.702

.897

1.168

1.792

2.52

Riskless Rate(%)

.399

.399

.399

.399

.399

Risk Premium

.303

.498

.769

1.393

2.121

oP(%)

2.548

3.856

5.109

6.701

8.477

SM

.119

.129

.151

.208

.25

N

1,396

963

594

354

131

Market Indexes Portfolios for Volatility (Control Groups)
an.,< 1 0

.1 0 < o „ .is.l3

.1 3 < a ^ „,s.l6

.I6 < ob. 4s .20

<j „_5>.20

Portfolio Reum(%)

.706

.89

1.162

1.704

2.487

Riskless Rate(%)

.399

.399

.399

.399

.399

Risk Premium

.307

.491

.763

1.305

2.088

ap(%)

2.518

3.842

5.151

6.8

8.879

SM

.122

.128

.148

.192

.235

N

1,466

1,015

628

397

152
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Table 1-4 Sbarpe Measure (SM) for Firm Size (FS) Portfolio
Sample Firm Size Portfolios (Based on Model 5-1)_____________
FS,., <$40*

$40<FS,_2
£$120

$120<FS,.j
£$340

$340<FS ,.4
$1,460

F S ,.,>
$1,460

Portfolio Rewrn(%)

1.730

1.141

.956

.832

.709

Riskless Rate(%)

.399

.399

.399

.399

.399

Risk Premium

1.331

.742

.557

.433

.31

of{%)

5.014

4.391

3.854

3.543

3.518

SM

.265

.169

.145

.122

.088

N

455

692

716

780

780

♦Million Dollars are omitted for all firm size.

Market Indexes Portfolios for Firm Size (Control Groups)
FSm_,<$40*

$40<FSB. I£
$120

$120 < FS,.)£$340

$340<FSB_ £ $ l.
460

FS„.J>
$1,460

Portfolio Return(%)

1.62

1.048

.909

.792

.665

Riskless Rate(%)

.399

.399

.399

.399

.399

Risk Premium

1.221

.649

.51

.393

.266

5.294

4.575

3.913

3.585

3.551

SM

.231

.142

.13

.11

.075

\

N

487

707

742

803

810

1

♦Million Dollars are omitted for all firm size.
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Table 1-5 Sharpe Measure (SM) for R&D Expenditures
Sample R&D Portfolios (Based on Model 5-1)
Own<
30* &
RD
<$I0»

Own <
30* &
10<RDs
$100

Own <3
0*&
RD >
$100

30* <
Owns60*
4RD <
$10

30* <
OwnstiO*

Portfolio
Retum(%)

1.472

1.145

.798

1.454

Riskless Rate(%)

.399

.399

.399

Risk Premium

1.073

.746

op(%)

5.195

SM
N

30* <
OwnstiO*
&RD >
$100

Own>
60* &
RD <
$10

Own >
60*4
)0<RDs
$100

Own >
60* &
RD>
$100

1.369

.746

1.848

1.478

.901

.399

.399

.399

.399

.399

.399

.399

1.055

.97

.347

1.449

1.079

.502

5.002

4.45

5.098

5.587

3.959

6.494

5.64

4.57

.207

.149

.09

.207

.174

.088

.223

.191

.11

263

69

11

158

122

38

39

100

40

&

$!0<RDs
< $100

"'Million Dollars are omitted for all R&D expenditures.

Market Indexes Portfo ios for R&D Expenditures (Control Groups)t
RD
I0<RD*
RD >
& RD >
& RD <
&
RD <
MKRDs
<$I0»

$100

$100

$10

$10<RDs
<$100

$100

$10

$100

RD>
$100

Portfolio
Retum( %)

1.403

1.265

.74

1.403

1.265

.74

1.403

1.265

.74

Riskless Rate(%)

.399

.399

.399

.399

.399

.399

.399

.399

.399

u>
■U

RD>

$100

s

§
*

§•

1

••N
*

vo

Vt

oae

•

CM

•

|

s

1•

a

1 3«n5

>e
•N•

tv
0\
CM

RD <

a

a

$10

$
«o

A

a
*8
V*

-g
g
ou

V

a
52

1
•n

A

Si

si

001$

u
1
H

§8
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•

§
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Table 2-1A Jobson and Korkie’s Statistics for Institutional Ownership
Institutional Ownership Portfolios (Based on Model 5-2 and 5-3)
N

EMR*

Own ,.,<20%

1,007

Maiket index ? .( n J

T

S H ta

e

ZSHi*

° t or

°im *

.541

3.372

13

94

.128

.219

.5 8 7

3,678

.592

3.905

20%<0wn,.2s40%

1,009

.605

3.9

15

94

.054

.273

.1 9 6

Maiket index P.f*)

3,678

.592

3.905

40%<0wn,.js60%

799

.584

4.129

16

94

-0.163

.207

- 0 .7 8 9

Maiket index P.Q

3,678

.592

3.905

60%<Own,Ms 80%

521

.64

4.498

17

94

-0.163

.461

- 0 .3 5 4

Maiket index P.(,„)

3,678

.592

3.905

Own ,_3>80%

99

1.162

5.113

18

94

1.51

.928

1 .6 3 *

Maiket index P .fJ

3,678

.592

3.905

own overall

3,440

.59

3.825

14

94

.03955

.301

.1314

Market index
P^J

3,678

.592

3.905

*EMR represents excess mean return,
^represents significant at the 5% level.
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Table 2-1B Jobson and Korkie’s Statistics for Institutional Ownership
Portfolio Comparisons Within Sample Portfolios (Based on Model 5-2 and 5-3)
N

EMR*
(P«)%

Oii%

o,(%

T

SHjj

e

Z SH jm

Own w>80%

99

1.162

5.113

13.9

94

1.137

1.016

Own (.,<20%

1,007

.544

3.372

1.11
9

Own j.3>80%

99

1.162

5.113

17.7

94

1.44

.99

1.455

20%<Own(.2^4
0%

1,009

.605

3.9

Own j.j>80%

99

1.162

5.113

19.5

94

1.812

.867

2.089*

40%<Ownj.3s6
0%

799

.584

4.129

Own w>80%

99

1.162

5.113

21.4

94

1.954

.903

2.165*

60%<OwnM£8
0%

521

.64

4.498

*EMR represents excess mean return,
^represents significant at the 2.5% level.

Table 2-2A Jobson and Korkie’s Statistics for Beta (P)
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Table 2-2B Jobson and Korkie’s Statistics for Beta (P)
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Table 2-4A Jobson and Korkie's Statistics for Firm Size
Firm Size Portfolios (Based on Model 5-2 and 5-3)
N

E M R * (p j „

orm^*

°im%

T

S H jm

d

ZSH i(n

ra)%
FS |.(<$40

455

1.331

5.013

^ (irl<$40

488

1.221

5.295

$4(KFS,.2£$120

692

.742

4.397

$4(XFSnr2Js$120

708

.649

4.571

$12(XFS j.jS$340

716

.557

3.868

Sl20<IiSlir4s$340

743

.51

3.928

$340<FSH:s$l,460

780

.433

3.56

$34tXFSnr4j;$l,460

804

.393

3.603

FS|.5>$ 1,460

781

.31

3.53

FSm.3>$l,460

811

.266

3.6

♦EMR represents excess mean return,
^represents significant at the 5% level.
** represents significant at the 2.5% level.

26.2

94

.9268

.4524

2 .0 4 9 * *

19.9

94

.539

.2958

1 .8 1 9 *

15.1

94

.2152

.1754

1 .2 2 7

12.8

94

.161

.0864

1 .8 6 3 *

12.6

94

.177

.171

1 .0 3 2
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Table 2-5A Jobson and Korkie’s Statistics for R&D Expenditures
R&D Expenditures Portfolios (Based on Model 5-2 and 5-3)
N

E M R * (p j

or

T

° im %

S H im

e

Z SH )ro

orm )%

Own<30% & Rdj.,,
<$10

263

1.073

5.192

RDnr.<$lO

480

1.005

5.443

Own<30%&
$10<RDW1 *$100

69

.746

4.993

$10<RDm_j *$100

297

.866

5.411

Own<30% &
$10<RDj.|, *$100

11

.399

4.439

RDm.J>$100

95

.341

4.024

30%<0wn*60%&
Rdj.3,<$10

158

1.055

5.101

R D ^ IO

480

1.005

5.443

30%<0wn*60% &
$10<RDj.2i *$100

122

.97

5.589

$10<RDnrZ ^$100

297

.866

5.411

30%<Own* 60%&
$10<RD,.2J *$100

38

.347

3.959

RDnr,J>$100

95

.341

4.024

27.7

94

.6224

.5875

1 .0 5 9

24.7

94

-0.287

1.16

- 0 .2 4 8

14.1

94

.0919

1.2

.0 7 6 6

26.7

94

.6159

.8

.7 6 9 8

29.6

94

.4086

.6478

.6 3 0 7

15.1

94

.0463

.5317

.0 8 7
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Table 2-5B Jobson and Korkie’s Statistics for R&D Expenditures
Portfolio Comparisons within Sample Portfolios
B

a n n M

N

B

B

a S B

EM R*(pj

a K

a n B

B

H

B

B

B

B

B

B

T

B

B

B

SHim

e

ZSH lm

®i or m°^°

°im%
18.3

94

2.276

1.6

1.422

23

94

3.387

1.827

1.85 *

14

94

2.41

1.647

1.46

orm)%
30%<0wn«s60% &
Rdj„2|<$10

158

1.055

5.1

Own>60% &
RDj.jj>$100

40

.502

4.584

Own>60% &

39

1.449

6.497

Own>60% &
RD|.j}>$100

40

.502

4.584

30%<0wns60% &
Rdj.I(<$10

158

1.055

5.101

30%<0wns60%&
$10<RDj.u *$100

38

.347

3.959

R«Vji <$10

*EMR represents excess mean return.
^represents significant at the 5% level.
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Table 3-1 Portfolio Betas (Pp) for Institutional Ownership (Based on Model 5-6)

Pp

Own
,.,<20%

20%<Own,.j
*40%

40%<Ownj.jS
60%

60%<Ownj.,s
80%

Own ,.,>80%

Own overall

.9342

1.188

1.212

1.258

1.217

1.112

Table 3-2 Portfolio Betas (Pp) for Beta (Based on Model 5-6)

Pp

P h <5

0.5<pwsl,0

1.0<pwsl.5

1.5<piMs2.0

P t.s>2.0

.3411

.7548

1.229

1.722

2.82

Table 3-3 Portfolio Betas (Pp) for Volatility (Based on Model 5-6)

Pp

o ,.,<.10

,1O<0 M!;.13

.13«j ,.,£.16

,16«J|.4£.20

o w>.20

.663

1.085

1.427

1.846

2.514

Table 3-4 Portfolio Betas (Pp) for Firm Size (Based on Model 5-6)
FS j.|<$40

$40<FS ,.2s$120

$120<FS j.jS$340

$340<FSiMs$l,460 FS,.}>$1,460

1.556

1.415

1.112

.9584

.932
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Table 3-S Portfolio Betas (flp) for R&D Expenditures (Based on Model 5-6)

pp(Portfolio beta)

pp(Portfolio beta)

pp(Portfolio beta)

Own<30% &
Rdj.,i<$10

Own<30% &
$10<RD|.I2 s $100

Own<30% &
$1<KRDWJ s$100

1.601

1,521

1,024

30%<Owns 60%&
Rdj.j,<$10

30%<0wns60% &
SKXRDj.j] s$100

30%<0wns60% &
$10<RDj.u $$100

1.708

1.406

.903

Own>60% &
Rdj.j|<$10

Own>60% & $
KKRD,.,, s$100

Own>60% &
SKKRDj.,, s$100

1.624

1.398

1.194
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Table 4-1 Jensen’s Alpha (a) Measure for Institutional Ownership Portfolio (Based on Model 5-4)
Portfolios

Intercept(a)

P-value Prob>|T|

R2

F-value Prob >F

Own j„|<20%

.000554

.59

.92

.0001

1,007

20%<0wnj.,s40%

.000216

.74

.97

.0001

1,009

40%<0wii|.js60%

-0.000278

.76

.96

.0001

799

60%<Ownj.js 80%

-0.000095

.95

.91

.0001

521

Own w>80%

.004595

.0457

.82

.0001

100

Own overall

.000127

.74

.99

.0001

3,440

N

Table 4-2 Jensen’s Alpha (a) Measure for Beta Portfolio (Based on Model 5-4)
Portfolios

Intercept(a)

P-value Prob>|T|

R2

F-value Prob >F

P h <5

.000626

.57

.33

.0001

687

0.5<pMsl.0

.000166

.82

.94

.0001

1,030

1.0<pwsl.5

-0.00014

.87

.97

.0001

909

1.5<piM£2.0

0.000159

.91

.96

.0001

457

P i-5>20

.000849

.72

.94

.0001

341

N
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Table 4-3 Jensen’s Alpha (a) Measure for Volatility Portfolio (Based on Model 5-4)
Portfolios

Intercept(a)

P-value Piob>|T|

R2

F-value Prob >F

o ,.,<.10

-0.000593

.54

.87

.0001

1,396

,10<o ms .13

-0.000764

.35

.96

.0001

963

, 1 3 < o 16

0.000123

.92

.95

.0001

594

.16«J h $.20

0.004393

.07

.88

.0001

354

o ,.j>.20

.009559

.01

.82

.0001

131

N

Table 4-4 Jensen’s Alpha (a) Measure for Firm Size Portfolio (Based on Model 5-4)
Portfolios

Intercept(a)

P-value Prob>|T|

R2

F-value Prob >F

FSW<S40

0.006213

.001

.87

.0001

455

$40<FS ,.,£$120

0.000956

.40

.94

.0001

692

$120<FS (.jsS340

-0.000195

.80

.97

.0001

716

$340<FS M£$l,460

-0.00092

.29

.95

.0001

780

FS t.}>$ 1,460

-0.001717

.29

.81

.0001

780

N
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Table 4-5 Jensen’s Alpha (a) Measure for R&D Expenditures Portfolio (Based on Model 5-4)
Portfolios

Intercept(a)

P-value Prob>|T|

R2

F-value Prob >F

Own<30%&
RdH)<$10

.003511

.11

.84

.0001

263

Own<30%&
$10<RDh i £$100

.00101

.71

.73

.0001

69

Own<30%&
$10<RDW, £$100

-0.000419

.91

.43

.0001

11

30%<Own£60%&
Rd,.I(<$10

.003351

.089

.87

.0001

158

30%<0wn£60% &
$1(XRDM2 £$100

.001878

.41

.85

.0001

122

30%<Owi»£60% &
$10<RD,.U £$100

-0.00108

.69

.58

.0001

38

Own>60% &
Rdj.j,<$10

.00612

.09

.72

.0001

39

Own>60% & $
10<RDH2 £$100

.003298

.25

.77

.0001

100

Own>60%&

-0.000826

.75

.71

.0001

40

$10<RD,.„ £$100

N
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Table 5-1 Jensen’s Alpha (a) Measure for the January Firm Size Portfolio (Based on Model 5-4)
Portfolios

Intercept(a)

P-valuePtob>|T|

R2

F-value Prob >F

FS |.|<$40

0.00111

.88

.78

.004

377

$4(KFSr2s$120

-0.002585

.55

.91

.0002

649

$120<FSwsS340

-0.002039

.57

.92

.0002

680

$340<FS iM£$ 1,460

-0.00039

.90

.95

.0001

743

FS,.j>$ 1,460

-0.00597

.12

.96

.0001

753

N

Table 5-2 Portfolio Betas (Pp) for the January Firm Size (Based on Model 5-4)

Pp

FS |.|<$40

$40<FSwiS120

$120<FSws$340

$340<FS iM£$l,460

FS (.,>$1,460

1.3714

1.4164

1.112

.9566

.926
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Table 6-1 Regression Results for the Relationship Between Institutional Ownership
and R&D Expenditures (Based on Model 5-9)
Variable

Parameter Estimate

P-alueProb>|T|

R2

F-value Prob >F

N

Intercept

7.4058

.0001

.27

.0001

9,621

Institutional
Ownership

.042214

.0001

Table 6-2 Regression Results for R&D Expenditures and Ownership Model Which
Incorporates Variables for Asset (Based on Model 5-9)
Variable

Parameter
Estimate

P-ValueProb>|T|

R2

F-value Prob >F

.4917

.0006

.62

.0001

Institutional
Ownership

.009771

.0001

Asset*

.700629

.0001

| Intercept

*Asset is represented by natural logarithm.

"
2,481

1
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Table 6-3 Regression Results for the Relationship Between R&D
Expenditures and Total Assets (Based on Model 5-9)
Variable

Parameter
Estimate

P-ValueProb>|T|

R2

F-value Prob >F

N

Intercept

-0.28766

.0001

.66

.0001

9,621

Asset

.788853

.0001

Table 7-1 Pearson Correlation Coefficients

Volatility
Beta
R&D
Asset
Ownership

Volatility

Beta

R&D

Asset

Ownership

1

.50921

-.197

-0.3651

-0.0407

1

-.042

-0.1368

0.098

1

0.767

0.454

1

0.322
1

in
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Table 7-2 Multiple Regression Results for Joint Effect Test
with All Variables (Based on Model 5-10)
Parameter
Estimate

P-ValueProb>|T|

VIF

Intercept

-0.0364

0.0001

0

Ownership

0.000213

0.0001

1.274

0.205

3.3555

Beta

0.0021

0.0006

1.444

1.403

1.2835

Volatility

0.06754

0.0001

1.631

2.313

1.0000

R&D*

-0.00253

0.0001

2.582

0.430

2.3192

Asset*

0.004

0.0001

2.949

0.648

1.8888

I Variable

R-square =0.0591

Adjusted R-square =0.0571

F-Value =28.749

F-value Prob >F

N

=0.0001

=2,292

♦Two variables are represented by natural logarithm.

Eigenvalue
-

Condition
Index
-

1
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Table 7-3 Multiple Regression Results for Joint Effect Test Without R&D Expenditures
(Based on Model 5-10)
Variable

Parameter
Estimate

P-Value Prob>|T|

VIF

Intercept

-0.00615

0.0234

0

Ownership

0.000173

0.0001

1.105

0.41187

2.049

Beta

0.001314

0.0001

1.423

1.21274

1.194

Volatility

0.028149

0.0004

1.591

1.72901

1.000

Asset*

0.000285

0.1323

1.258

0.64637

1.635

R-square =0.0232

Adjusted R-square =0.0227

F - Value =47.175

F-value Prob >F

N

=0.0001

=7,959

*Two variables are represented by natural logarithm.

Eigenvalue
-

Condition
Index
-
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HYPOTHESES TEST RESULTS
NULL HYPOTHESIS

REJECT

H01: Mean risk-adjusted excess
returns of stock portfolios do not
correlate positively with
institutional investor
concentration percentages.

XXXXX

Ho2: Stock portfolios with higher

IMPLICATIONS
Institutional investors as a whole are not better performers than
market index. However, they possessed a partial superior stock
selection ability. Individual portfolios performed in a superior
manner. Portfolios held in greater percentage by institutions
performed better than those with less holdings by institutions.

XXXXX

P risk do not exhibit greater
risk-adjusted abnormal rates of
return than those with lower p
risk for market-based portfolios
of equal systematic risk.
Ho3: Stock portfolios with higher

FAIL TO
REJECT

Portfolios with larger beta stocks did not outperform portfolios with
small beta stocks for market based portfolios of equal systematic risk.
Higher beta portfolio did not contribute to the institutional investors’
superior stock selection ability.

volatility exhibit greater or less
rates of return than those with
lower volatility.

Stock portfolios with higher volatility exhibited greater rates of
return than those with lower volatility. Jensen’s alpha measure
implies that stock volatility may be used to contribute to institutional
investor’s excess stock selection ability.

H04: Stock portfolios composed
XXXXX
of small firms' stocks do not
exhibit greater risk-adjusted rates
of return than those composed of
large firms' stocks, ceteris
paribus.

The smaller firms generated higher monthly mean excess riskadjusted rates of return. The larger firms generated lower mean
excess risk-adjusted rates of return. In this study, the small firm
effect resulted in the greatest contribution to institutions’ superior
selection power. However, the small firm-January effect could not be
found.

XXXXX

w
*
-J
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HYPOTHESES TEST RESULTS (continued)
NULL HYPOTHESIS

REJECT

H0Sa: Firms' R&D expenditures
and institutional stock ownership
percentages do not correlate.

XXXXX

H^b: Stock portfolios with
higher R&D expenditures and
higher concentrations of
institutional investors do not
exhibit greater risk-adjusted rates
of return than those with less
R&D expenditures and lower
concentrations of institutional
investors, ceteris paribus.

FAIL TO
REJECT

IMPLICATIONS
Institutional investors are not myopic investors. They are consistent
to previous results by Kochhar and David (1996) and Hansen and
Hill (1991). In the context of R&D expenditures, institutional
investors acted hyperopically.

XXXXX

R&D expenditures were not positively correlated with portfolio
performance. Both bigger firms and higher institutional ownership
are positively correlated with higher R&D expenditures. However,
bigger firms are inversely related to portfolio performance. It
implies that institutional investors prefer larger firms with higher
R&D expenditures. They expect higher R&D expenditures would
bring higher profits in the long-run.

00

I
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